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Abstract
Collaboration between academic and research institutions has become fairly
common. Traditional methods of identity management do not scale across
institutional borders and this places an increasing responsibility on users to
remember a large number of credentials. As a result, collaboration has be-
come a risky and expensive task. Federated Identity Management facilitates
the cooperation of identity processes, policies and technologies and fosters
an environment of secure resource sharing in heterogeneous IT environments
(Jensen, 2012; Malik, Anwar, & Shibli, 2016).
The adoption of Federated Identity Management has been lower than ex-
pected across industries. The research and education sector has had relative
success in this regard (Landau & Moore, 2012). However, there is little liter-
ature on the practices of federations in this sector. As a result there is little
insight into the challenges of implementing Federated Identity Management
within the research and education sector. Similarly, there is also little insight
into the solutions deployed to overcome these challenges.
This research study aims to compile lessons learnt from the implemen-
tation of Federated Identity Management within the research and education
sector. Semi-structured interviews are conducted to learn the experiences of
seven federations from around the globe. Literature and stakeholder input
is used as a filter to analyse and structure data into themes.
Identified themes are used to derive eight lessons learnt from the imple-
mentation of Federated Identity Management within the research and educa-
tion sector. These lessons provide guidance to new federations in this sector,
capitalizing on its strengths and avoiding its weaknesses.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Collaboration amongst institutions and organizations in similar sectors of
industry has been on the rise coming into the 21st century. This is especially
true for national and regional research organizations, for whom collaborating
has become the norm (Broeder et al., 2013).
Traditional forms of identity management such as the isolated model are
limited and do not scale well outside institutional borders. Federated Identity
Management is a response to the limitations of isolated identity management
in environments where cross institutional, local and international collabora-
tion is required. Federated Identity Management enables the cooperation
of identity processes, policies and technologies and fosters an environment
of secure resource sharing in heterogeneous IT environments (Jensen, 2012;
Malik et al., 2016).
The concept of Federated Identity Management has been readily accepted
by academic literature, in which wide-spread adoption was predicted. How-
ever, industry has not been as enthusiastic about Federated Identity Manage-
ment and the adoption of Federated Identity Management has not met the
expectations of literature (Jensen & Jaatun, 2013; Landau & Moore, 2012;
Smith, 2008).
The research and education sector has had relative success implementing
Federated Identity Management (Landau & Moore, 2012). Literature has
attributed this success to the highly collaborative nature of the research and
education sector together with its more trusted environment (Smith, 2008).
The EduGAIN federation is proof of the compatibility and supportive
nature of the research and education sector with regard to Federated Identity
1
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Management. EduGAIN is a global federation consisting of a number of
national federations with more than 40 members as of 2017. Shibboleth
and SAML (Secure Assertion Mark-up Language) have been key enablers
of EduGAIN and Federated Identity Management in general in the research
and education sector (Ferdous & Poet, 2013; Arias-Cabarcos, Almenarez-
Mendoza, Marin-Lopez, & Diaz-Sanchez, 2009).
Literature has identified challenges responsible for the low adoption and
failure of Federated Identity Management through industry. Smith (2008)
states that Federated Identity Management is not rocket science, but that
there is confusion as to what it delivers and the complexity it entails. The
lack of understanding and perceived complexity of implementing Federated
Identity Management has created a barrier to its adoption.
1.1 Problem Statement
Literature has shown concern for the low adoption of Federated Identity
Management (Jensen & Jaatun, 2013). Failed implementations of Federated
Identity Management have revealed unique challenges facing specific parts
of industry (Chadwick, 2009). Despite this, Federated Identity Manage-
ment has been relatively successful within the research and education sector
(Landau & Moore, 2012). Literature has identified the mutual desire for col-
laboration in the trusted environment of the research and education sector
as the primary reason for this (Smith, 2008).
However, literature has not given much attention to the research and ed-
ucation sector as a whole. Federated Identity Management has only recently
been standardized with the help of Shibboleth. Earlier implementations of
Federated Identity Management relied on proprietary software and differed
from country to country.
There is little insight into the challenges of implement-
ing Federated Identity Management within the research
and education sector. Similarly, there is also little in-
sight into the solutions deployed to overcome the afore-
mentioned challenges.
New federations such as the South African Identity Federation (SAFIRE)
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
must identify and address the challenges of implementing Federated Identity
Management in this sector to achieve the desired rate of adoption. Learn-
ing from the failures and capitalising on the successes of already established
federations will reduce the time and increase the chance of implementing Fed-
erated Identity Management successfully within the research and education
sector.
1.2 Research Objectives
With the problem statement in mind, the primary objective of this research
is to identify lessons learnt from the implementation of Federated Identity
Management within the research and education sector.
Fulfilling this primary objective will provide insight into the unique chal-
lenges and opportunities faced by the research and education sector. To
achieve the primary objective, a number of sub-objectives must be met.
• Describe the state of Federated Identity Management within industry
• Identify the benefits and challenges of Federated Identity Management
• Determine the current state of Federated Identity Management within
the research and education sector
• Collect the experiences of implementing Federated Identity Manage-
ment throughout the global research and education sector
The completion of the four sub-objectives will allow Federated Identity
Management literature and the experiences of federations within the research
and education sector to be combined and the primary objective to be fulfilled.
1.3 Delineation
By increasing insight into the experiences of implementing Federated Iden-
tity Management in the research and education sector, young identity fed-
erations such as the South African Identity Federation (SAFIRE) have the
opportunity to accelerate growth and to participate in the global federation,
EduGAIN. Value is drawn from lessons when common errors are avoided and
advantageous opportunities are not missed.
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This research is also applicable to young, established, and future federa-
tions within the research and education sector.
1.4 Research Methods
The review of prior literature is an essential part of any academic research
project (Webster & Watson, 2002). Therefore, literature is used to under-
stand and to discuss the benefits of Federated Identity Management, the
challenges of implementation and the individual components which make up
typical federations throughout industry. Literature is also used to discuss
the current state of Federated Identity Management within the research and
education sector.
Interviews provide insight into the world, opinions, thoughts and expe-
riences of those being interviewed (Hove & Anda, 2005). Semi-structured
interviews are used to collect the experiences of established identity federa-
tions within the global research and education sector. The semi-structured
nature of the interviews allows the researcher to control the direction of the
conversation, but makes provision for the flexibility and freedom essential to
gain new insights.
Qualitative analysis and argumentation combining interview data and
literature are used to derive the lessons learnt from implementing Federated
Identity Management within the research and education sector.
1.5 Layout of Study
Chapter 1, provides an introduction to Federated Identity Management and
the purpose of the study. Details of how the study will be organized and
conducted is found in Chapter 2, Research Methodology.
To gain a better understanding of the research topic, Chapter 3, Federated
Identity Management, describes the current state as well as identifies the
benefits and challenges of Federated Identity Management. Chapter 4, FIM
in Research and Education, provides more focus by describing Federated
Identity Management within the research and education sector.
Interviews are a qualitative method of data collection. Chapter 5 explains
the choice of interviews as well as how they were constructed using Federated
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Identity Management literature as a primary input. After the interviews
have taken place, they must be analysed in an appropriate way. Chapter
6, Analysis, describes how the interviews were transcribed, coded and then
separated into logical themes with the use of Federated Identity Management
literature and stakeholder input.
The study cumulates in Chapter 7, Lessons, with the discussion and pre-
sentation of lessons learnt from implementing Federated Identity Manage-
ment within the research and education sector. Eight lessons are derived
from argumentation together with Federated Identity Management literature
and interviews.
The conclusion of the study comes Chapter 8, where a reflection on the
processes and output of the study together with limitations and the direction
of future research is presented.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the layout of the chapters. The upcoming chapter,
Research Methodology, contains a detailed layout and description of how the
study is organized and what each chapter entails.
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Figure 1.1: Chapter Layout
Chapter 2
Research Methodology
Most qualitative research includes a chapter titled research methodologies or
at least a specific portion dedicated to “data and methods” (Silverman, 2013).
The purpose of the research methodology chapter is to inform the reader
about how data was gathered, how the data was organized and analysed,
and how the final output was reached.
The chapter begins by outlining the qualitative nature of this research.
The rest of the chapter elaborates on the three phases this research has been
divided into to. First the initiation and planning phase, then the knowledge
and data phase and lastly the analysis phase. The intention is to convey
to the reader, the systematic thought process and series of steps followed
throughout the execution of the research.
2.1 Overview
From the beginning of the 17th century, the importance of objectivity and
evidence was emphasized in the search for truth. In the 19th century, Auguste
Comte asserted that the social world could be studied through invariable laws
in the same way as natural sciences. This school of thought or paradigm is
known as positivism (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003).
In 1781 Immanuel Kant published his Critique of Pure Reason. Kant’s
argument was that there are other ways of knowing about the world other
than direct observation and that people use these ways all the time. Max
Weber (1864 - 1920) believed that analysis of material conditions as used
in a positivist approach was important but not sufficient in understanding
7
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people’s lives and experiences. Additionally, Max Weber emphasized that
the research must understand the meaning of social actions within the con-
text of the material conditions in which people live. This school of thought
that stresses interpretation as well as observation is known as interpretivism
(Ritchie & Lewis, 2003).
Positivism aims to produce law-like propositions and immutable truths,
where interpretivism, including qualitative research, aims to understand peo-
ple’s experiences and perspectives to increase general understanding of a
particular station or topic (Ravitch & Carl, 2015).
2.1.1 Qualitative Research
Qualitative research emerged as a formal field in the late 1960s (Ravitch &
Carl, 2015). However qualitative paradigms were in practise well before the
1960s. From the late 19th century and throughout the 20th century, qualita-
tive research methods evolved and became more sophisticated as researchers
became aware of the research process and responded to challenges from other
methodologies and paradigms such as positivism (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003).
During the 20th century, positivism was the dominant paradigm. Quali-
tative research was often criticised as ’soft’ and ’unscientific’. In an attempt
to combat this view, qualitative researchers formalised their methods and
stressed the importance of rigour in data collection and analysis.
Qualitative research exists within many disciplines. For this reason qual-
itative research can be difficult to explain as it has no theory or paradigm of
its own (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). However, qualitative research methods do
have features in common. Data collection methods are context specific and
flexible. Methods involve understanding as well as detail and context.
Qualitative research can be difficult to define as it is used as an overar-
ching category and covers a wide range of approaches and methods from a
number of different research disciplines (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). Ravitch
and Carl (2015) broadly defines qualitative research as the methodological
pursuit of understanding the ways that people see, view, approach and ex-
perience the world and make meaning of their experiences as well as specific
phenomena within it.
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2.1.2 Relevance to this research
The primary objective of this research is to produce a list of lessons learnt
from implementing Federated Identity Management in the research and edu-
cation sector, globally. Literature on the subject of Federated Identity Man-
agement highlights a number of the benefits together with the challenges
of implementing Federated Identity Management. This literature is useful
for any federation looking to implement itself successfully by capitalizing on
benefits and avoiding potential points of failure.
However, literature is general and includes all sectors of industry. Landau
and Moore (2012) state that Federated Identity Management has enjoyed
more success in the research and education sector than in other parts of in-
dustry. Smith (2008) mirrors this statement when he says that the adoption
of Federated Identity Management is already well established in communities
of trust such as the research and education sector. To produce lessons on im-
plementing Federated Identity Management successfully in the research and
education sector specifically, literature cannot be the only source of informa-
tion.
The success of Federated Identity Management relies on solving sensitive
challenges and concerns such as privacy and security. User perception, orga-
nizational risk appetite and national law differ substantially on issues such as
these from country to country. It is therefore necessary to accommodate the
experiences and perspectives of national research and education federations
to increase ones understanding on this topic.
A delineation of this research is to produce lessons that can be used or
adapted by the South African Identity Federation as a primary stakeholder.
For these lessons to be useful to the South African environment, they will
need to be viewed through the unique lens of the South African research and
education sector, its students and researchers.
A qualitative method of data collection provides the structure and means
to collect the experiences of identity federations from selected national iden-
tity federations within the research and education sector around the globe.
These experiences, together with literature will provide a more complete set
of lessons learnt from implementing Federated Identity Management in the
research and education sector.
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2.2 Overall Research Design
This research is divided into three distinct phases. Each phase comprises two
components, as can be seen in Figure 2.1
Phase One is the Initiation and Planning Phase. This phase consists of
an initial literature review of Federated Identity Management, followed by a
description of the stakeholder visit.
Phase Two is the Knowledge and Data Acquisition Phase. A second
literature review is conducted with a primary focus on Federated Identity
Management in the research and education sector. Interviews with feder-
ations in the research and education sector are conducted as the primary
means of data collection.
Phase Three is the Analysis Phase. Firstly, important themes are identi-
fied from the primary data. Lessons are synthesized by means of argumen-
tation and combining identified themes with both literature reviews.
Initiation and Planning Phase Knowledge and Data Phase Analysis Phase
Literature 
Review 1
SANReN Visit
Literature 
Review 2
Interviews
Identifying 
Themes
Synthesizing 
Lessons
Phase One Phase Two Phase Three
Figure 2.1: Research Layout
2.3 Initiation and Planning Phase
This section will introduce and explain the contents of the Initiation and
Planning Phase. This phase consists of a literature review and details of the
interaction with major stakeholders. The literature review titled, Federated
Identity Management can be found in Chapter 3.
2.3.1 Literature Review of Federated Identity Man-
agement
A literature review will be conducted to gather and organize the history and
current state of Federated Identity Management structurally within academic
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literature. Chapter 3, titled Federated Identity Management contains the lit-
erature review. The reader is first introduced to Federated Identity Manage-
ment within the context of identity management as a whole. The literature
review proceeds to inform the reader of the components of Federated Iden-
tity Management together which a short history of early implementations.
The benefits of Federated Identity Management are identified and explained
to inform the reader of the value of Federated Identity Management. The
literature review concludes with the challenges of Federated Identity Man-
agement, to make the reader aware of the the major reasons that literature
has shown concern for low rates of adoption.
2.3.2 Stakeholder Visit
The South African National Research and education Network (SANReN) is a
major contributor to the formation of the South African Identity Federation
(SAFIRE). As such, both organizations are stakeholders in this research.
In the early stages of the research proposal, I visited SANReN at their
main campus in Pretoria, South Africa. The visit lasted for three weeks
during which time I gained first-hand exposure in setting up a federated
service together with the operation of Shibboleth, software used to enable
Federated Identity Management in educational environments.
During my visit I met with several engineers who played a role in the
formation of SAFIRE. Discussions were centred on the state of SAFIRE
at the time, particularly the challenges it faces. The unique South African
environment with it’s young democracy and wide range of cultures, languages
and privacy/security perspectives were mentioned.
In conclusion, the primary area of concern is the successful adoption of
SAFIRE in the unique environment of South Africa. Even though the global
sector of research and education is enthusiastic to provide guidance, it became
clear that simply implementing an identity federation in South Africa would
not work unless it was significantly tailored to the South African environment.
The SANReN team of engineers contain an impressive amount of talent
within their ranks including backgrounds in electronic engineering, project
management, cyber security, computer sciences, data handling and enterprise
level networking technicians.
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2.4 Knowledge and Data Acquisition Phase
With a broad understanding of Federated Identity Management and direc-
tion from the stakeholders, the research can enter the second phase, the
Knowledge and Data Acquisition Phase.
This section explains the reason for a second literature review. Then
the method of primary data collection, interviews, will be introduced and
explained.
The literature review titled, FIM in Research and Education can be found
in Chapter 4. An in-depth explanation and report of the interview process
can be found in Chapter 5.
2.4.1 Federated Identity Management in Research and
Education Extended Literature Review
The first literature review titled, Federated Identity Management gives a
broad description and history of Federated Identity Management and high-
lights its benefits and challenges.
The second literature review described in this second phase of research is
titled FIM in Research and Education. The purpose of this literature review
is to gather and to organize structurally academic literature of Federated
Identity Management specifically within the research and education sector.
The reader is introduced to the history of Federated Identity Management
in higher education as well as past and present enablers such as Athens and
Shibboleth respectively. EduGAIN is introduced together with the South
African Identity Federation (SAFIRE)
2.4.2 Interviews
The second literature review together with the first literature review pro-
vides a complete picture of Federated Identity Management in research and
education. However, literature on Federated Identity Management is general
throughout all parts of industry. To fulfil the primary research objective
of producing the lessons learnt from implementing Federated Identity Man-
agement in the research and education sector, academic literature must be
supplemented with primary data.
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Federated Identity Management has been implemented in the research
and education sector, globally for well over a decade. Learning the expe-
riences and strategies of these federations can offer insight into the unique
benefits and challenges of Federated Identity Management in this sector. The
research and higher education sector encourages cooperation and progress
throughout. This collaborative nature allows SAFIRE to benefit from feder-
ations around the globe.
Rubin and Rubin (2011) suggests that if questions cannot be answered
briefly and it is anticipated that respondents may need to explain, describe
and give examples, then interviews are the preferred method of data collec-
tion. Qu and Dumay (2011) strengthens this statement by confirming that
interviews are one of the most important qualitative data collection meth-
ods. Therefore, interviewing selected federations from around the globe will
be the method of primary data collection.
Interviews can be divided into three main categories: structured, semi-
structured and un-structured. Semi-structured interviews make use of both
structured and un-structured components. They involve prepared questions
divided into themes with probes designed to encourage more elaborate re-
sponses. Semi-structured interviews are the most popular of all categories
owing to their flexibility and their ability to uncover hidden information (Qu
& Dumay, 2011). Figure 2.2 describes interviews as a spectrum where a semi-
structured approach would fall in the middle. This shows that interviews are
not rigid, but can be adjusted along the spectrum to suit the needs of the
specific research they are used for.
Structured
Semi-
Structured
Un-
Structured
Figure 2.2: Interview Spectrum
Semi-Structured interviews were chosen as the primary method of data
collection for this research. Literature has provided themes and a basis on
which to formulate questions for interviewees. However, in order to capture
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the specific attributes of Federated Identity Management in the research and
education sector, the interviewer is given the freedom to follow up on any
unexpected or interesting answers provided by the interviewees.
2.4.3 Participant Selection
The South African National Research and education Network SANReN pro-
vided the contact details of persons within six established federations, as well
as that of the director of the South African Identity Federation (SAFIRE).
Each identity federation was contacted via email and asked to participate
in an interview regarding their experiences within their respective identity
federations. All six identity federations agreed and interviews were arranged
at the convenience of the interviewees.
Although a number of the interviewees were eager to reveal their identity,
if was decided that the individual identities of the interviewees would be kept
private. Therefore, the names and contact details as well as other details will
not be included in this research.
The pool of interviewees consists of a number of different titles and posi-
tions within their respective federations, including:
• Technical Engagement and Support Manager
• Network Operations and Administration
• Associate Vice President for Trust and Identity
• Principal Technical Support Specialist
• Project Development Officer
• Developer
• Project Director
An argument can be made for interviewing current and potential mem-
bers of SAFIRE in South Africa. Documenting the concerns and limita-
tions of institutions within the South African research and education sector
can provide SAFIRE with information on how to proceed in South Africa’s
unique environment. However, the aim of this research is to fill the gap in
academic literature with regard to implementing Federated Identity Manage-
ment specifically in the research and education sector.
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2.5 Analysis Phase
With a complete understanding of the literature of Federated Identity Man-
agement in higher education together with primary data, the third phase,
the Analysis Phase can begin.
This section describes the process of identifying themes in the data as well
as synthesizing lessons as the final part of fulfilling the primary objective of
this research. This phase can be found in Chapter 6, Analysis.
2.5.1 Identifying Themes
The first step of data analysis is to convert the recorded interviews into a
more usable format. Rubin and Rubin (2011) stresses the importance of real-
time recording and later transcription of interviews. Interview transcription
is more reliable than interview notes which rely on memory. Silverman (2013)
emphasizes the fact that although field notes can provide a summary of what
people said, memory simply cannot be relied upon for pauses, overlaps, in-
breaths, out-breaths, etc.
Transcripts are academic records and can be revised and re-analysed from
several angles. Furthermore, (Silverman, 2013) goes on to point out that
preparing transcripts should not simply be seen as a technicality prior to
analysis. The convenience of transcripts for presentation purposes is an added
convenience. Ravitch and Carl (2015) state that simply listening to interview
recordings, lacks a kind of deep interaction with the text of the interview
and without transcripts it is difficult to engage in intensive, iterative data
analysis.
Atlast.ti 7 was used to transcribe the interview recordings as well as
to code the transcriptions into segments. Atlast.ti is considered to be one
of the most sophisticated qualitative research coding software in existence
(Silverman, 2013).
Rubin and Rubin (2011) discuss the precision to which transcripts must
be written. They mention that at the most precise level, everything is
recorded including grammatical errors, digressions, abrupt changes in fo-
cus, profanity, exclamations and other indicators of mood such as laughter
or tears. However, they also point out that the level of detail in the transcrip-
tion should match the type of research being done. It may only be necessary
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to include “uhmms” and “ahhs” to retain the feeling of conversation that
was had between the interviewer and interviewee. In this regard, I included
pauses, digressions and changes in focus to understand the importance that
the interviewees put on certain topics. I did not include all grammatical
errors, profanities or additional factors that were not core to the topic of this
research. A brief example of the transcription detail can be seen in Figure
2.3
Figure 2.3: Transcription extract
Coding involves assigning codes to ’chunks’ of data. Axial coding, also
called Thematic clustering coding is a process of transition from coding data
to seeing how the codes come together into coding categories or clusters
(Ravitch & Carl, 2015).
I began by creating codes based on themes from literature such as Adop-
tion, Privacy and Security. As the processes of coding the transcripts pro-
ceeded, more complex codes such as Value proposition and Weaknesses of
identity federation were created.
Family codes were created to group individual codes together in logical
themes. A list of the family codes are shown in Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4: Family Codes
With the interviews transcribed and coded into themes, final analysis and
argumentation can begin.
2.5.2 Synthesizing Lessons
With the interview data organized into themes as explained in the previous
section, together with the findings from the literature reviews in Chapters 3
and 4, the final part of the Analysis Phase can begin.
It is important to distinguish the difference between data analysis and in-
terpretation. Qualitative research is inherently subjective by definition and
this subjectivity or researcher bias is seen as a positive thing. Interpretation
is the way that individuals make sense of their world and this occurs all the
time as a natural part of humanity. Data analysis, on the other hand, is
an intentional and systematic process of interpreting data. Unlike interpre-
tation, data analysis describes data in ways that reflect both process and
insight (Ravitch & Carl, 2015).
Therefore, argumentation will be used to combine literature with the
real world experience of federations to produce a list of lessons learnt from
implementing Federated Identity Management in the research and education
CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 18
sector.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has explained how data will be gathered, how the data will be
organized and analysed, and how the final output will be reached.
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 contain the two literature reviews in respective
order. Chapter 5 contains the process of the interviews. Chapter 6 contains
the analysis of the resulting data and synthesizes the data with the two liter-
ature reviews to produce a set of lessons learnt from implementing Federated
Identity Management in the research and education sector. Chapter 7 will
conclude the research.
Chapter 3
Federated Identity
Management
To use an online web service, a user is generally required to login with a user-
name and password. For a long time, passwords have been the most common
means for user authentication on the web (Hu¨hnlein, Roßnagel, & Zibuschka,
2010). Today the number of web services that a user interacts with on a daily
basis is increasing. This puts strain on users who are expected to remember
unique credentials for each service they use (Pashalidis & Mitchell, 2003).
Traditional methods of identity management are struggling to cope with
the highly collaborative nature of the present IT environment. In response
to this, Federated Identity Management is a promising approach to establish
secure resource sharing and collaboration among industry partners in het-
erogeneous environments (Jensen & Nyre, 2013). Federated Identity Man-
agement reduces the number of credentials a user is required to memorize
by facilitating cooperation on identity processes between federation members
(Jensen, 2012).
However, the adoption of Federated Identity Management has been lower
than the initial predictions of academic literature (Jensen & Jaatun, 2013;
Landau & Moore, 2012; Smith, 2008). Furthermore, there have been a num-
ber of failed Federated Identity Management implementations. Therefore,
this literature review will collect and examine academic literature in order
to gain an understanding of the current progress of Federated Identity Man-
agement and to identify its benefits and challenges.
The chapter begins with an overview of identity management and where
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Federated Identity Management fits in. Then Federated Identity Manage-
ment is dissected and examined in terms of its actors, protocols and archi-
tecture. The benefits of Federated Identity Management are identified and
discussed, followed by the challenges of Federated Identity Management.
3.1 Identity Management Today
One half of identity management is the issuing, management and termination
of user credentials. The second half of identity management is authenticat-
ing and controlling access to services and resources (Josang & Pope, 2005).
Identity management is usually the first layer of security and accountability
(Bhargav-Spantzel, Squicciarini, & Bertino, 2006).
Identity management can be separated into three categories or models.
They are the isolated model, the centralized model and the distributed model
(Ahn & Lam, 2005; Shin, Ahn, & Shenoy, 2004).
3.1.1 Isolated Identity Management
Of the three models, the isolated model is the oldest and most conservative
(Shin et al., 2004). The conservative nature of the isolated model is its down
fall, but is also the reason it is still in use. The isolated model does not
interact with any outside implementations of identity management and thus
retains full control of the entire identity management cycle (Josang, Fabre,
Hay, Dalziel, & Pope, 2005).
The institution implementing an isolated model of identity management
is the sole identity provider and service provider for its users. This requires
users to create new credentials in order to use services outside institutional
borders. As institutional collaboration is becoming more widespread, au-
thentication at each service provider is no longer the preferred method of
identity management (Kylau, Thomas, Menzel, & Meinel, 2009).
Figure 3.1 illustrates the conservative nature of the isolated model.
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Figure 3.1: Isolated Model
3.1.2 Centralized Identity Management
A centralized model of identity management allows a user to access several
service providers and resources using a single identity provider. A single au-
thority acts as the identity provider for all participating services (Dhamija
& Dusseault, 2008). Users can access all resources across participating insti-
tutions with as few as a single credential.
Although industry is embracing cross-institutional collaboration more
and more, a single identity authority raises several privacy and security con-
cerns. Landau and Moore (2012) point out that in the competitive nature of
industry, who gets to keep transactional information has been a major con-
tributor to the failure of federations in the past. Even if users create multiple
identities in an attempt to mask their activities, patterns in user attributes
and use can allow the identity provider to link the various identities to a
single individual (Birrell & Schneider, 2013).
A central identity authority provides a single target for DoS (Denial of
Service) attacks (Han, Mu, Susilo, & Yan, 2010). All relying institutions
must trust the central authority to be available continuously and to risk
delays in the case of an incident.
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Figure 3.2 illustrates the central identity authority and resource sharing
among institutions.
Institution B
Resource 2
Central Identity Authority
Institution A
Resource 1
Identity 
Assertions Issued
Resource sharing and collaboration
Figure 3.2: Centralized Model
3.1.3 Distributed Identity Management
The distributed model of identity management is a de-centralized version of
the previous model. Instead of authentication being the responsibility of a
single authority, it is shared amongst all members (Jensen & Nyre, 2013). A
participating member may implement its own identity system while trusting
other participants to authenticate users on their behalf, thus sharing the cost
of identity management (Ahn & Lam, 2005).
This approach still requires a certain level of trust between participants,
however there is no clear single point of failure and through the use of as-
sertions, explained later in the chapter, privacy can be preserved to a much
greater degree.
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Figure 3.3 illustrates the sharing of identity costs and resource sharing
among institutions.
Service Provider A
No Identity provider
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Identity Provider A
Resource 1
Service A
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Issued
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Identity provider B
Resource 3
Resource sharing 
and collaboration
Sharing of 
identity 
cost
Figure 3.3: Distributed Model
Federated Identity Management allows and facilitates cooperation on
identity processes, policies and technologies across institutions borders (Jensen,
2012). A federation consists of two or more institutions cooperating accord-
ing to agreed rules. Both the centralized and distributed models of identity
management satisfy this definition, and are considered part of Federated
Identity Management.
3.1.4 Single Sign-On
Single Sign-On is a synonymous term with Federated Identity Management.
However, the concept of Single Sign-On and Federated Identity Management
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should not be used interchangeably or thought of as being the same. Single
Sign-On gives a user the ability to access a protected resource by authenti-
cating themselves once, and then to access other protected resources without
having to re-authenticate.
Single Sign-On is commonly used within enterprise networks, where em-
ployees are provided with a security assertion that can be used to access
services throughout the institution, such as e-mail, file servers and internet
access (Jensen, 2013). Employees authenticate themselves once and remain
authenticated throughout the institution until the security assertion is ter-
minated or times out.
Single Sign-On was implemented to address one of the most prominent
issues at the turn of the 21st century, the high cost of user-management
(Gross, 2003). A study conducted at the time by the Network Applications
Consortium showed that the majority of calls to help desk were password
related. Single Sign-On allows administrators to deal only with one set of
credentials per user. Similarly, the help desk only needs to keep track of one
entry for each user in their data base (De Clercq, 2002).
Pashalidis and Mitchell (2003) categorizes Single Sign-On into four sys-
tems: Local pseudo Single Sign-On , Proxy-based pseudo Single Sign-On
, Local true Single Sign-On and Proxy-based true Single Sign-On systems.
Understanding these four categories of Single Sign-On assists in making a
distinction between stand alone Single Sign-On and Federated Identity Man-
agement.
Pseudo Single Sign-On allows a user to experience Single Sign-On in its
most basic form. A User’s credentials are stored either on the user’s local
machine or on an external proxy server. A user authenticates himself once
and then relies on the pseudo Single Sign-On system to authenticate him on
his behalf every time a service requires authentication.
True Single Sign-On requires predetermined trust agreements between
services and identity providers. Local true Single Sign-On is under the control
of the user and therefore requires mechanisms to ensure integrity. Proxy-
based true Single Sign-On is the more commonly implemented Single Sign-
On system within enterprises. The user’s institution takes responsibility for
being the identity provider and has trust relationships with all supported
services.
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Federated Identity Management is more ambitious than Single Sign-On
and offers more value, of which Single Sign-On is only one part. Federated
Identity Management enables Single Sign-On, but Single Sign-On does not
enable Federated Identity Management. Cooperation on identity processes,
policies and technologies in a secure resource-sharing environment are some
of the benefits of Federated Identity Management (Jensen, 2012; Malik et
al., 2016). The above categories of Single Sign-On were once only possible
within the confines of a single organization. Federated Identity Management
enables Single Sign-On across institutional and even national borders.
3.2 Federated Identity Management
Federated Identity Management is not a new concept. Academic literature
has been identifying, discussing and addressing the benefits of Federated
Identity Management as well as the challenges affecting its adoption for
some time. Jensen (2012) defines Federated Identity Management as the
cooperation on identity processes, policies and technologies across institu-
tional borders. Jensen and Nyre (2013) add to this definition by stating that
Federated Identity Management is a promising approach to establish secure
resource sharing and collaboration among partners in a heterogeneous IT
environment.
This section will focus on and explain the actors, protocols and architec-
ture of Federated Identity Management.
3.2.1 Federated Identity Management Actors
Literature primarily mentions three actors in Federated Identity Manage-
ment. These three actors are the identity provider, the service provider and
the user (Han et al., 2010; Khattak, Sulaiman, & Manan, 2010). However, it
is useful to add a fourth actor, the federation operator. Smedinghoff (2012)
explains that in a federation with a large number of institutions, there is often
an entity referred to as a trust framework provider or a federation operator.
A federation participant is not limited to a single role. In a distributed
federation, a number of institutions are able to assume the role of both
identity provider and service provider (Birrell & Schneider, 2013).
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Users
Each user has an identity that consists of various attributes. These attributes
describe the user. A person becomes a user when he attempts to make use
of a service or resource.
A user may be an independent actor on the internet, or a user may be an
employee, student or researcher at an institution belonging to a federation.
Identity Provider
An identity provider has two primary tasks: to authenticate users and to store
and manage user attributes (Birrell & Schneider, 2013). Authentication is
the process where by users prove their identity to the identity provider. To
store and manage user attributes is a great responsibility and it is in the
best interest of the identity providers to keep user information secure and
up-to-date.
An identity provider may be an individual actor on the internet, or a
users home institution.
Service Provider
Service providers are institutions which make their resources available for use
to users. A service provider relies on an identity provider’s authentication
assertions about a specific user when authorization decisions are to be made.
A service provider may be an individual actor on the internet or a par-
ticipating institution in a federation.
Federation Operator
The fourth actor in Federated Identity Management is the federation oper-
ator. The need for a federation operator depends on the nature and size of
the federation (Smedinghoff, 2012). Similarly the role and responsibility of
the federation operator is linked to the nature and size of the federation and
the agreement between federation participants. Generally, the responsibility
of the federation operator is to define the framework or set of rules dictating
how the previously mentioned actors interact.
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Execution
The process of authentication in Federated Identity Management begins
when a user attempts to access a resource. In the case of a centralized
federation, a user is redirected to the central authoritative identity provider.
In the case of a distributed federation, a user may choose his home institu-
tion or desired identity provider from a list of identity providers, and is then
redirected. Once the identity provider authenticates the user, an assertion is
sent to the service provider containing relevant information about the user.
Hughes, Maler, Microsystems, and Lockhart (2005) explain that assertions
allow the identity provider to assert characteristics and attributes of a sub-
ject (the user) to the service provider. The service provider then authorizes
the user, and the user is granted the appropriate level of access.
Figure 3.4 visually illustrates this process.
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Service 
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E-mail
Service:
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forwards 
authorization 
to Home 
Institution
Home 
Institution 
sends 
assertion
Figure 3.4: Federated Identity Management Actors
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3.2.2 Federated Identity Management implementations
Over the last decade, some implementations of Federated Identity Manage-
ment have been successful, and others have failed. The following implemen-
tations of Federated Identity Management have had a noticeable impact on
the direction and progress of Federated Identity Management.
Microsoft Passport
Microsoft Passport was one of the first major attempts at implementing
Federated Identity Management on the internet (Han et al., 2010). Microsoft
Passport was the underlying authentication system of Microsoft’s Hotmail
and was also integrated into Windows XP (Ahn & Lam, 2005). Microsoft
had the intention to become a global identity provider for multiple services,
not just its own. Microsoft Passport was designed as a centralized model
with Microsoft being the sole identity authority.
Bhatti, Bertino, and Ghafoor (2007) points out that trying to implement
a centralized model of Federated Identity Management on this scale, con-
tradicts the distributed nature of the internet. Although Microsoft Passport
was able to attract a number of key early adopters such as eBay, it failed to
gain traction and eventually early adopters started leaving (Hu¨hnlein et al.,
2010). Microsoft Passport ultimately failed to achieve the desired adoption
figures (Chadwick, 2009). Security and privacy concerns about the central-
ized nature of Microsoft Passport have been singled out as the primary reason
for its failure (Hu¨hnlein et al., 2010).
OpenID
OpenID is not originally a Federated Identity Management protocol. Rather,
it is simply a fairly popular web-based authentication protocol. Through the
addition of extensions such as the Attribute Exchange extension, attributes
can be exchanged between different institutions (Ferdous & Poet, 2013).
OpenID was developed and released in 2005 to provide a decentralized
way of authenticating users who wish to post comments on the LiveJournal
online community (Maler & Reed, 2008). Since then, OpenID has spread
across the internet with many websites acting as free identity providers and
several thousand websites accept OpenID as a method of authentication.
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However, OpenID is has not been popular amongst organizations and has
not attracted many service providers (Landau & Moore, 2012). Despite the
benefits and simplicity of OpenID, there are severe limitations with regard
to trust, security and privacy (Arias-Cabarcos et al., 2009). In most imple-
mentations, OpenID identity providers only provide service providers with a
username and an email address.
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) was originally created by OA-
SIS (Organisation for the Advancement of Structured Information Stan-
dards). The Liberty Alliance was formed in 2001 with the objective to cre-
ate guidelines and standards for identity management. The Liberty Alliance
includes over 150 organizations and in 2005, joined forced with OASIS to
produce SAML 2.0 (Landau & Moore, 2012; Scudder & Jøsang, 2010).
SAML is an XML based framework that allows the exchange of security
assertions between entities in a federation (Arias-Cabarcos et al., 2009). Un-
like OpenID, which has become popular with the internet, SAML has found
great success amongst organizations owing to its strong trust, security and
privacy preserving properties. As a result, SAML and all other implemen-
tations based on SAML have become the most widely used technology for
implementing Federated Identity Management (Ferdous & Poet, 2013).
Additional Implementations
Facebook has developed a centralized version of OpenID that allows users
to log into third-party websites using their Facebook credentials (Landau
& Moore, 2012). Interestingly, Facebook’s centralized approach has become
more successful than OpenID and has not struggled to gain traction as was
the case with Microsoft Passport.
Facebook’s success lies in its ability to lure weary service providers by
providing demographics of users as well as social networking information,
vastly superior to most implementations of OpenID. Additionally, Hu¨hnlein
et al. (2010) states that Microsoft Passport’s failure should be attributed
to distrust in Microsoft, rather than to general security and privacy issues.
It is also worth noting that the immense popularity of social networking
together with the increased usage of Federated Identity Management over
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recent years, has influenced security and privacy concerns since the initial
release of Microsoft Passport.
3.2.3 Architecture
During the implementation of a Federated Identity Management system, the
layout or topology of the federation must be considered. Within the research
and education sector, the two main implementations of Federated Identity
Management are the full-mesh and the hub-and-spoke. Each topology has
benefits and shortfalls over the other which is why both must be considered
in relation to the environment in which it is being implemented.
The Full-Mesh topology interconnects all identity providers and service
providers directly. The role of the federation operator is reduced to creat-
ing and sharing the lists of meta data containing routes to all participating
members. Full-Mesh places more technical responsibility on the institutions,
requiring them to configure and maintain links with the rest of the feder-
ation. The benefit of this approach is that start up for the federation is
cheap and simple. Each institution decides who in the federation they wish
to participate with and works on its own to establish a connection.
Hub-and-Spoke connects all federation participants to a central hub. The
central hub is managed by the federation managers, usually a neutral third
party. The benefit of this topology is that the technical responsibility rests
in the hands of the federation operator. Federation participants only need
to connect with the hub, and the hub provides access to the rest of the fed-
eration. The hub can also implement additional features such as specialized
encryption and two-factor authentication available for all members of the fed-
eration with little effort on the part of the institutions. The Hub-and-Spoke
architecture is expensive to set up initially and requires dedicated staff and
technical skills to maintain.
Figure 3.5 illustrates the topological differences between a full-mesh topol-
ogy and a hub-and-spoke topology.
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Figure 3.5: Full-Mesh vs Hub-and-Spoke
3.3 Benefits of Federated Identity Manage-
ment
With the rapid increase in cross-institutional collaboration in industry, tra-
ditional isolated models of identity management do not scale well and are
no longer the preferred method of identity management (Kylau et al., 2009).
Federated Identity Management has been designed to facilitate cross-institutional
collaboration by providing Single Sign-On capabilities amongst other benefits
in a security and privacy preserving way.
SAML 2.0 is the most popular technology for implementing Federated
Identity Management; and Shibboleth, based on SAML is used extensively
within the research and education sector around the globe (Ferdous & Poet,
2013; Landau & Moore, 2012). For this reason, the benefits of Federated
Identity Management in general will be identified and discussed with specific
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emphasis on these two federation enabling technologies
This section discusses the following six benefits of implementing Feder-
ated Identity Management. The six benefits are improved security (Jensen,
2011; Arias-Cabarcos et al., 2009; Ferdous & Poet, 2013), improved pri-
vacy (Smedinghoff, 2012; Chadwick, 2009; Landau & Moore, 2012), Reduced
cost (Ahn & Lam, 2005; Smith, 2008; Jensen, 2014), improved data quality
(Jensen, 2013, 2014; Satchell, Shanks, Howard, & Murphy, 2011), collabora-
tion (Broeder et al., 2013; Malik et al., 2016; Chadwick, 2009) and better
user experience (Kylau et al., 2009; Scott, Wynne, & Boonthum-denecke,
2016; Landau & Moore, 2012).
3.3.1 Improved Security
The greatest information security plans are incomplete as long as end users
lack proper information security awareness and education (Lebek, Uffen, Bre-
itner, Neumann, & Hohler, 2013). Security Education Training and Aware-
ness (SETA) programmes are designed to educate and make end users aware
of proper security practices and common security threats.
Educating users on the importance of proper password etiquette is a core
part of SETA programmes. Through these programmes, end users are taught
how to create, store and use passwords that meet basic security requirements.
One such basic security practice is to use a different password for every
identity used. Dhamija and Dusseault (2008) state that in 2008 an average
end user had approximately 25 different identities in total, and used up to 8
on a day to day basis.
Federated Identity Management reduces the number of login credentials
users have to use to access resources within the federation. This lightens
the burden on users and aids the success of information security awareness
programs such as SETA by encouraging the use of a limited number of strong
login credentials (Scudder & Jøsang, 2010).
SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) makes use of assertions
between identity providers and service providers. Assertions are statements
that contain authentication, authorization and attribute information about
a user (Arias-Cabarcos et al., 2009). SAML encourages security and privacy
by allowing the identity provider to only include necessary user information.
If service providers require more information to authorize a user, they can
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request addition information as needed (Ferdous & Poet, 2013).
3.3.2 Improved Privacy
Privacy is an integral concern in any organizational identity management
system (Smedinghoff, 2012). Privacy has been a major topic of discussion in
Federated Identity Management literature and has been identified as a signifi-
cant contributor to the low adoption rate of past implementations (Chadwick,
2009). Jensen (2012) states that users should be able to enjoy increased pri-
vacy protection through Federated Identity Management without a loss of
information quality passed on to service providers.
Satchell et al. (2011) define privacy as an Individual’s claim that informa-
tion about themselves should not be available to other individuals or organi-
zations and that the individual must be able to exercise a substantial degree
of control over their data. This highlights the user’s expectations of privacy
in Federated Identity Management .
Integrating privacy protection is not just to please users. Bhatti et al.
(2007) state that privacy protection is becoming increasingly important to
businesses from a social and legal perspective. It is in the best interests of
identity providers to implement adequate privacy protection to avoid privacy
law violations. Satchell et al. (2011) suggest that a balance is required be-
tween effective governance, legal needs and national security needs on the
one hand; and an individual’s dignity and privacy on the other.
SAML implementations of Federated Identity Management disclose the
minimal amount of user information needed for a service provider to authorize
users (Ferdous & Poet, 2013). SAML 2.0 makes use of pseudonyms that
only have meaning in the context of the relationship between the identity
provider and service provider. The purpose of this is to prevent institutions
from linking user identities and activities, and to maintain an appropriate
level of user anonymity (Shin et al., 2004). Users still have the option to link
pseudonyms to their identity if they wish (Hughes et al., 2005).
Shibboleth is an open-source implementation of Federated Identity Man-
agement and is currently the de facto standard in the research and education
sector (Catuogno & Galdi, 2014). Users are identified by their rights to the
resource, as a member of a particular campus, course and cross-institutional
research group rather than by their user ID. The user ID is just another at-
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tribute only shared if the service provider requires it to grant access (Landau
& Moore, 2012). Shibboleth requires both administrators and users to have
control over the release of attributes to providers insuring strong privacy
protection of user details (Chadwick, 2009).
3.3.3 Reduced Cost
Being cost-effective is an important requirement for the success of Federated
Identity Management (Ahn & Lam, 2005). A separation of duties allows
service providers to allow trusted identity providers to authenticate users on
their behalf. This potentially allows service providers to avoid the expense
and responsibility of storing user information (Chadwick, 2009).
The separation of duties furthermore reduces cost by the consolidation
of key business areas such as help desk pointed out by Smith (2008) and a
simplified auditing process pointed out by Jensen (2014).
Furthermore, Federated Identity Management facilitates the formation
of relationships between industry partners to realize common goals at lower
costs (Satchell et al., 2011).
3.3.4 Improved Data Quality
To authorize users securely, service providers need accurate and up-to-date
information. Jensen (2014) points out that despite policy stating that pass-
words must be updated every 90 days, most users will continue to reuse their
password after expiry. A user who makes use of multiple credentials on a
daily basis is unlikely to keep his information up-to-date at every identity
provider.
Jensen (2013) highlights the security concerns of outdated identity at-
tributes. Employees’ access rights could change; users’ contact numbers can
change; digital certificates and credit card information can expire. Jensen
concludes that it is therefore necessary for identity management processes to
include procedures to keep user identity attributes up-to-date.
The approach of Federated Identity Management to establishing secure
resource sharing and collaboration among partners in heterogeneous IT envi-
ronments, simplifies the process and policing of updating user identities. By
reducing the number of identities per user to as few as one per federation, re-
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liably and consistently updating user information and levels of authorization
becomes a more realistic goal.
Additionally, identity providers have more motivation to improve relation-
ships with their users. In this way, identity providers can focus on improving
the overall process of authentication (Chadwick, 2009).
3.3.5 Collaboration
Traditional isolated models of identity management do not scale well with
cross-institutional collaboration. An institution would have to add users from
collaborating partners to their identity management system. This not only
increases the cost of collaboration, but also introduces dangerous security
vulnerabilities. One such security vulnerability is account revocation (Jensen,
2013).
Broeder et al. (2013) emphasises the importance of collaboration in re-
search and higher education. A number of institutions and service providers
should be able to work together to complete research projects without users
being obliged to remember a growing number of accounts and passwords.
Jensen and Nyre (2013); Jensen (2014) presents the highly collaborative
environment of the Norwegian oil and gas industry, explaining the beneficial
but also competitive relationship between contractors and suppliers.
Federated Identity Management simplifies and encourages collaboration
between federation members (Malik et al., 2016). Using a limited number of
identities per user when collaborating with federation partners addresses the
concern of account revocation. Rather than contacting all the institutions a
user has collaborated with in the past, a users home institution only needs
to update their records and all federation members using that identity will
be updated.
Additionally, by trusting another institution to manage user identifica-
tion, a service provider is able to focus on improving the quality of their
resources and services. Furthermore, a service provider is able to make their
resources and services available to multiple identity providers, and thus to a
larger audience (Chadwick, 2009).
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3.3.6 Better User Experience
A major benefit of Federated Identity Management found in literature is an
improved user experience (Kylau et al., 2009). Within collaborative envi-
ronments, users have been expected to remember an increasing number of
accounts and passwords while abiding by an organizational security policy.
By reducing the number of accounts per user, Federated Identity Manage-
ment encourages users to create strong passwords according to organizational
requirements (Scott et al., 2016).
Additionally, Single Sign-On allows users to access several resources through-
out the federation without having to re-authenticate at each service provider.
This has a direct link to improved productivity and quality of work (Landau
& Moore, 2012).
3.4 Challenges in Federated Identity Man-
agement
At the turn of the 21st century, literature was optimistic about the future of
Federated Identity Management. Today literature has expressed concern for
the relatively low rate of Federated Identity Management adoption (Jensen &
Jaatun, 2013; Landau & Moore, 2012; Smith, 2008). Literature has discussed
a number of challenges that are responsible for the low observed rate of
Federated Identity Management adoption.
This section discusses the following six challenges of implementing Fed-
erated Identity Management. The six challenges are trust (Smith, 2008;
Bhargav-Spantzel et al., 2006; Landau & Moore, 2012), liability (Jensen,
2012; Smedinghoff, 2012; Landau & Moore, 2012), security (Shin et al., 2004;
Bhargav-Spantzel et al., 2006; Han et al., 2010), privacy (Morgan, Cantor,
Carmody, Hoehn, & Klingenstein, 2004; Malik et al., 2016; Landau, Gong,
& Wilton, 2009), investment cost (Shin et al., 2004; Jensen & Nyre, 2013;
Smith, 2008) and the awareness barrier (Smith, 2008).
3.4.1 Establishing Trust
Mcknight and Chervany (1996) define trust as “the extent to which one party
is willing to depend on the other party in a given situation with a feeling of
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relative security, even though negative consequences are possible”. Although
this definition of trust is general, there are three relevant concepts that can
be extracted. First, the dependence on a trusted party; second, the reliability
of the trusted party; and third, a possibility of negative consequences in the
event of an incident (Josang et al., 2005).
Dependence
Smith (2008) argues that trust is a fundamental underlying concept of Feder-
ated Identity Management. Bhargav-Spantzel et al. (2006) defines Federated
Identity Management as a group of organizations which trust certain kinds
of information from any member of the group as being valid.
To make authorization decisions, a service provider must trust that user
information received from an identity provider is accurate and up-to-date
(Landau & Moore, 2012). Identity providers must trust service providers to
handle user information securely in a privacy preserving manner.
The trust dependence on federation members is apparent in the most
popular Federated Identity Management specification, SAML (Secure Asser-
tion Markup Language). The success of SAML enabled federations is largely
dependent on a pre-configured trust relationship. Literature has identified
pre-configured trust relationships as a barrier to Federated Identity Manage-
ment adoption in some parts of industry (Ferdous & Poet, 2013).
The failure of Microsoft Passport to gain widespread adoption has been
attributed to distrust in Microsoft (Hu¨hnlein et al., 2010).
Reliability
To establish and maintain trust between institutions, reliability and assur-
ance must be established. Identity assurance is achieved by providing trans-
parency into how risks associated with identity information are being man-
aged (Baldwin, Casassa Mont, Beres, & Shiu, 2010). Baldwin et al. (2010)
continue to point out that while identity management is a well supported
technology, and that while there are standards for Single Sign-On, authenti-
cation and authorization, many aspects remain procedural and rely on people
doing the right thing. This makes it difficult to establish assurance and reli-
ability.
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Negative Consequences and Risk Appetite
Part of understanding Federated Identity Management is to understand and
account for additional risk. Institutions in a federation are likely to come into
contact with institutions of varying risk appetite. A difference in risk appetite
will have a direct impact on the ability to establish trust relationships, as an
institution with a low risk appetite may not find it acceptable to depend on
an institution with a higher risk appetite (Jensen, 2012).
3.4.2 Liability
Liability is the state of being legally obliged or responsible (Jensen, 2012). In
the event of a security breach or system failure, Who shoulders the blame?
has become a stumbling block for many federations. Liability is not a new
concern for identity management; however Federated Identity Management
has introduced new complexities (Jensen & Jaatun, 2013). The boundaries
of security and privacy have changed and are not as clear as they once were.
This has resulted in new liability and privacy risks (Landau & Moore, 2012).
Landau et al. (2009) states that the threat of being held liable has become the
main motivator for privacy implementation in Federated Identity Manage-
ment. Who is liable in the case of failure is clearly an important prerequisite
that must be properly understood by all parties involved.
Smedinghoff (2012) states that the failure of law to address liability issues
properly has presented a barrier to identity systems. Smedinghoff carries on
to say that the U.S. National strategy has recognized that concerns around
liability represent a key barrier to the adoption of Federated Identity Man-
agement. The U.S. National strategy has stated that liability issues would
best be addressed by contractual agreements among federation participants.
These agreements should be compliant with internal rules and regulations of
institutions, those of partners and legal constraints (Jensen, 2012).
Returning to Smedinghoff’s statement regarding the failure of law to ad-
dress liability issues properly; it is important to remember that laws differ
from nation to nation. In the banking industry, the U.S. provides ample pro-
tection of card holders with the Lending Act of 1968 and the Electronic Funds
Transfer Act. These Acts shift the liability as a result of fraud away from
the card holder, and onto the issuing banks and merchants banks (Landau &
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Moore, 2012). By comparison, UK consumer protection has historically been
weaker and UK banks have shifted the responsibility on to the card holder
where possible.
Landau and Moore (2012) argues that a balance of liability is necessary.
Once each party feels that they have a fair portion of liability then the
federation is more likely to succeed.
Federated Identity Management allows identity management to be imple-
mented with minimal data exchange. Liberty Alliance specifications enable
a number of privacy protecting features, but it remains the responsibility of
the implementers to conduct risk assessments and to manage liability prop-
erly, in line with the suggestion of the U.S. National strategy (Landau et al.,
2009; Smedinghoff, 2012).
3.4.3 Security
Security issues are a key concern in Federated Identity Management (Shin
et al., 2004). Federated Identity Management improves the overall security
of cross collaboration in several ways highlighted earlier. However, like all
forms of identity management, Federated Identity Management is not per-
fectly secure. By solving one problem, Federated Identity Management raises
another (Landau et al., 2009). Allowing users to use a smaller number of
credentials in exchange for a few strong credentials has obvious security ad-
vantages. However, identity theft is a serious concern (Bhargav-Spantzel et
al., 2006). Identity theft occurs when a malicious user uses a honest user’s
credentials without his permission. Attackers who gain access to a single set
of credentials could theoretically acquire access to several resources (Han et
al., 2010). The reverse argument here is that with fewer passwords, users
can better protect against phishing attempts. Two step authentication is a
means many federations are deploying to reduce the risk of phishing attacks
and identity theft.
Once a user is authenticated, they receive a token which they use to
access other resources without having to re-authenticate. Much research is
being put into the protection of these tokens. A token intercepted may allow
attackers temporary access to multiple resources so long as the lifetime of
the token persists. A trade off between user convenience and security has to
be reached concerning the lifetime of these tokens.
CHAPTER 3. FEDERATED IDENTITY MANAGEMENT 40
3.4.4 Privacy
A foundational issue for any identity system is protecting privacy (Smedinghoff,
2012). A benefit of Federated Identity Management is enhanced user privacy,
however solving one problem has raised others (Landau et al., 2009). Feder-
ated Identity Management blurs security borders and has created new privacy
risks and vulnerabilities. Jensen (2012) labels privacy as a major challenge
in Federated Identity Management, and is currently a hot topic in Feder-
ated Identity Management literature. The research and education sector has
placed strict requirements on the protection of privacy and was the focus
around the development of Shibboleth (Morgan et al., 2004). Despite this,
privacy has not been catered for in many other implementations of Federated
Identity Management (Malik et al., 2016).
To understand the difference of privacy priority, one must consider the
different sector and national environments. Some sectors in the US have strict
privacy laws in place which influence the priority of privacy in associated
implementations of Federated Identity Management. At the same time there
are other sectors in the US that have very little privacy laws (Smedinghoff,
2012).
3.4.5 Investment Cost
Simplified identity management at reduced cost is a benefit of Federated
Identity Management (Shin et al., 2004). However, initial investment cost is
often necessary (Jensen & Nyre, 2013). Smith (2008) mentions that some in-
stitutions may need to reconstruct or replace their current system of identity
management if it is not compatible with Federated Identity Management.
Changing or adapting an institution’s current method of identity manage-
ment can be an expensive and risky exercise. A possible strategy mentioned
by Jensen and Nyre (2013) is to first adapt systems where investment cost
is lower, before adapting the entire system.
3.4.6 Awareness Barrier
A lack of knowledge of Federated Identity Management may have a negative
impact on the adoption. Smith (2008) says “While identity management is
not rocket science, there’s confusion as to what it delivers and the complexity
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involved.” Current knowledge about Federated Identity Management or the
lack there of is a barrier to the adoption of Federated Identity Management.
Even though Federated Identity Management has been around for a number
of years, industry is still hesitant to give up the tried and tested methods
of collaboration. Fear of the unknown causes industry to focus on negative
aspects of Federated Identity Management.
The user community is also suffering from a lack of knowledge. Resulting
in a lack of pressure from users pushing their institutions to invest time into
gaining proper understanding of Federated Identity Management.
3.5 Conclusion
Federated Identity Management was introduced on a large scale at the turn
of the 21st century in the form of Microsoft Passport. Despite its benefits,
Microsoft Passport encountered a number of challenges which prevented its
wide spread adoption. Since then, literature has discussed the potential of
Federated Identity Management, its benefits and its challenges.
This chapter began by introducing Federated Identity Management and
comparing it to traditional models of identity management. Then the defin-
ing attributes of Federated Identity Management was discussed followed by
benefits and challenges found in literature.
In line with the objective of this research, the following chapter, FIM in
Research and Education, will present the literature on Federated Identity
Management specifically within research and education.
Chapter 4
Federated Identity
Management within the
Research and Education Sector
Chapter 3 identified and discussed the challenges of implementing Feder-
ated Identity Management. Literature states that the adoption of Federated
Identity Management has been lower than initially predicted. However, im-
plementations of Federated Identity Management within the research and
education sector have been relatively more successful than in other parts of
industry (Landau & Moore, 2012; Smith, 2008)
This literature review will focus on Federated Identity Management within
the research and education sector. The chapter begins with introduction of
Federated Identity Management to the research and education sector at the
turn of the 21st century. The progress of Federated Identity Management
in this sector such as the development of Shibboleth and the formation of
EduGAIN are discussed. The chapter ends off by exploring the environment
of the South African research and education sector and the challenges that
SAFIRE (South African Identity Federation) must address.
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4.1 Federated Identity Management in Higher
Education
Literature has attributed the relative success of Federated Identity Manage-
ment within the research and education sector to its more trusting environ-
ment compared to that of other parts of industry (Smith, 2008). This is
strengthened by a mutual willingness to collaborate with other institutions
on research projects and the advancement of education (Ferdous & Poet,
2013).
Near the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century, the re-
search and education sector found collaboration increasingly difficult owing
to rising complexities and costs. At the fifth Annual Educause Current Is-
sues Survey, security and identity management were identified as critical IT
challenges on university campuses (Morgan et al., 2004).
Without the aid of Federated Identity Management, some services such
as JSTOR were forced to authorize students and researchers via network
addresses, rather than via individual user accounts protected with proper
authentication. JSTOR had to invest significant resources to detect and pro-
tect against security threats owing to a lack of proper identity management
that could scale appropriately (Morgan et al., 2004).
It was clear that the research and education sector at large had to adopt
an alternative method of identity management that would facilitate its col-
laborative environment.
4.1.1 Athens
Early attempts to federate identity management were isolated and not stan-
dardized throughout the research and education sector. Athens, which was
a centralized implementation of Federated Identity Management was used
throughout Europe and particularly the UK higher education sector (Smith,
2008).
Athens relied on proprietary protocols, creating a barrier to its adoption.
Being a centralized system, Athens suffered from similar trust issues as other
centralized federations, such as Microsoft’s Passport. Efforts to standardize
Federated Identity Management protocols resulted in Athens being phased
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out from the UK higher education sector in favour of Shibboleth in 2008
(Chadwick, 2009).
4.1.2 Shibboleth
Shibboleth, based on the SAML standard is an implementation of Federated
Identity Management specifically designed for the research and education
sector (Gross, 2003).
In 1999 the Internet2 established its Middle-ware Initiative, and worked
on issues such as authentication, authorization and directory services (Morgan
et al., 2004). In June 2003, the Internet2 Middle-ware Initiative effort pro-
duced Shibboleth version 1.0. Unlike Athens, Shibboleth, being based on
SAML, is open-source and standardized. Additionally, Shibboleth follows a
distributed model allowing users to be authenticated by their home institu-
tion (Chadwick, 2009).
Shibboleth was developed to overcome various challenges present in the
research and education sector. Challenges such as interoperability across
institutional boarders, enabling home institution authorization and reducing
the number of credentials per user in a secure and privacy-preserving way
(Khattak et al., 2010). As a result, Shibboleth has been a success with the
research and education sector and circles of trust (Landau & Moore, 2012).
The primary reason for Shibboleth’s success in the research and educa-
tion sector is its ability to meet the strong requirements of higher-education
communities with regards to the protection of personal information (Morgan
et al., 2004). Privacy was critical to the design of Shibboleth (Landau &
Moore, 2012). Chadwick (2009) lists four ways in which Shibboleth protects
user privacy. Firstly, Shibboleth supports anonymous authentication (Birrell
& Schneider, 2013). A randomly generated identifier can be used instead
of a user’s permanent unique identifier. Secondly, service providers are able
to request specific attributes needed to authorize users instead of simply re-
questing all attributes. This minimizes the opportunity for potential privacy
loss. Thirdly, Shibboleth requires identity providers to provide control over
the release of user attributes in the form of attribute release policies. Lastly,
to prevent third parties from seeing attributes in transit, connections should
be protected with SSL/TLS with strong encryption enabled.
Thanks to the standardized, secure and privacy-preserving Shibboleth,
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Federated Identity Management within the research and education sector
was able to expand and interconnect the globe through EduGAIN.
4.2 EduGAIN
EduGAIN is the product of an effort to interconnect identity federations
around the globe within the research and education sector, allowing the se-
cure exchange of information. EduGAIN is a service developed within the
GEANT project. The GEANT project is a collaboration between European
National Research and Education Network (NREN) organizations and the
European Union. Today, EduGAIN serves as a federation of federations for
the entire global research and education sector. Figure 4.1 shows the extent
of the EduGAIN global community.
EduGAIN Member
Voting-Only members
Candidates
Figure 4.1: Global Map of EduGAIN As of 25/08/2017. (From
https://technical.edugain.org/status.php)
EduGAIN enables researchers, students and educators to access and share
online resources securely with reduced complexity and cost. At the same
time, users are authenticated by their local institution, reducing the number
of credentials per user. Service providers benefit by offering their services to
an international community.
The EduGAIN technology retrieves and aggregates information from par-
ticipating federation’s services and identity providers and makes it available
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through what is called a Metadata Service. The exchange of information is
controlled though a policy framework. As of 31 August, EduGAIN facilitates
the collaboration and exchange of information of 48 member federations.
Table 4.1 displays the number of federation members in EduGAIN. Table
4.2 shows the number of entities throughout EduGAIN. Note that the sum
of identity providers and service providers equals more than the total. This
is as a result of some institutions participating both as an identity provider
and as a service provider.
Table 4.1: EduGAIN Members As of 25/08/2017
Federations in EduGAIN
Members 45
Voting-only Members 7
Candidates 11
* Note: Adopted from
https://technical.edugain.org/status.php
Table 4.2: EduGAIN Entities As of 25/08/2017
Entities in EduGAIN
All 4207
Identity Providers 2513
Service Providers 1698
* Note: Adopted from
https://technical.edugain.org/status.php
4.3 South African Identity Federation
The South African National Research and education Network (SANReN)
together with The Tertiary Education and Research Network of South Africa
(TENET) have launched the South African Identity Federation (SAFIRE) for
the research and education sector. SAFIRE is an independent organization
drawing a large portion of its funding from early adopters. SAFIRE currently
has 8 identity providers as seen in Table 4.3 and offers 9 services as seen in
Table 4.4.
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Table 4.3: SAFIRE Identity Providers As of 25/08/2017
Identity Provider Participants in SAFIRE -
(IDP) CSIR (Council for Scientific and Industrial Re-
search)
(IDP) Nelson Mandela University
(Pending IDP) North-West University
(IDP) SANReN Competency Area
(IDP) Stellenbosch University
(IDP) TENET South Africa
(IDP) University of Cape Town
(Pending IDP) University of Western Cape
* Note: Adopted from https://safire.ac.za/participants/idp/list/
Being one of the most recently implemented federations in the global re-
search and education sector, SAFIRE is reaping the benefits of over a decade
of innovation and trial and error. Thanks to the inherently collaborative
nature of the global research and education sector, SAFIRE is making use
of the valuable opportunity to learn from the successes and failures of other
federations in this global sector. Examples include the use of open source
standardized software like Shibboleth, developed by the Internet2 and first
used by InCommon.
Table 4.4: SAFIRE Service Providers As of 25/08/2017
Service Provider Participants in SAFIRE -
(SP) African Research Cloud
(SP) CSIR-SANREN File Sender
(SP) figshare
(SP) OnTheHub
(SP) SheerID Verification Services
(SP) eduroam South Africa NRO
(SP) SA NREN Mconf web conferencing
(SP) SAFIRE Test Service Provider
(SP) UCT DEV Filesender
* Note: Adopted from https://safire.ac.za/participants/sp/list/
In February 2017 SAFIRE became the 41st member of EduGAIN and the
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first fully participating member from Africa (SAFIRE, 2017).
4.3.1 South African perspective
At the time Liberty Alliance and OASIS released SAML, and the Internet2
developed Shibboleth, South Africa was celebrating its first decade as a free
country. The focus of South African research and government was to bridge
the economic and social gaps left by apartheid (Brown, Hoppe, Mugera,
Newman, & Stander, 2004). Around this time, no culture-specific research
had been done to understand how IT should be approached for South Africa
(Gefen, Rose, Warkentin, & Pavlou, 2005).
It would take another decade before SAFIRE was created. However, there
are advantages to being a late adopter of a technology, especially in the
research and education environment. Federated Identity Management has
been relatively successful in the education sector and many of the challenges
mentioned in Chapter 2 have been addressed by federations around the globe.
SAML and Shibboleth have improved both in terms of simplicity and of
security. Physical technology has matured and both the Full-Mesh and Hub-
and-Spoke topologies have been tested and implemented with successes.
South Africa has a mix of first and third-world components, different
ethnicities and cultures, 11 official languages, and large economic and edu-
cational gaps (Gefen et al., 2005). However, South Africa is also one of the
leaders in IT adoption in Africa, and is the first African member of EduGAIN.
There are a number of factors unique to the South African environment that
must be considered to ensure the success of SAFIRE.
SAFIRE is a perfect example of a young federation working to estab-
lish itself by addressing the challenges of Federated Identity Management
in a unique environment. This research, which aims to identify, gather and
document lessons learnt from implementing Federated Identity Management
in the research and education sector, will help young federations such as
SAFIRE benefit from the past experiences of other federations within this
sector.
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4.4 Conclusion
The research and education sector has been relatively successful in the im-
plementation of Federated Identity Management. Enablers like Shibboleth,
developed with an emphasis on simplicity and privacy protection are key
driving factors of this success. As a result, the research and education sector
has become one global federation through EduGAIN.
New federations can benefit from the collaborative nature of the research
hand education sector. Rather than implementing Federated Identity Man-
agement from scratch, young federations like SAFIRE have the opportunity
to avoid common challenges by following the example of earlier federations.
Chapter 5
Interviews
Chapter 3 discussed the current state of Federated Identity Management
throughout industry, including the value it provides and the challenges of
its implementation. Chapter 4 discussed the history, relevance and state
of Federated Identity Management within the research and education sec-
tor. Together, these two chapters describe Federated Identity Management
according to literature.
This chapter will outline and discuss the primary method of data collec-
tion, interviews. Seven identity federations from around the globe are inter-
viewed in a semi-structured setting. Each interview comprise five distinct
topic areas, derived from literature and stakeholder input. All interviews
will be recorded with the consent of the interviewees and then transcribed to
facilitate proper analysis of the collected data.
5.1 Interview Structure
An interview is a social interaction between an interviewer, in this case the
researcher, and the interviewee, personnel from selected federations. Both the
interviewer and the interviewee share in constructing a story together with its
meanings. The interviewee reveals and places emphasis on information based
on his subjective opinion and experiences. The interviewer or researcher,
within the confines of qualitative research, analyses and interprets the data
subjectively.
In Chapter 2, Research Methodology, Interviews have been described as
existing on a spectrum.
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Structured interviews consist of fixed questions that do not change from
one interview to the next interview. The focus is to compare replies between
interviewees directly. Therefore, structured interviews do not allow for prob-
ing questions, nor do they allow the interviewees to elaborate on what they
previously said. The researcher must ask every interviewee the same ques-
tions in the same order to prevent previous questions from influencing the
interviewee’s train of thought or mood in any inconsistent way.
At the other end of the spectrum, unstructured interviews do not contain
any prepared questions and each interview may take a different direction
from the interviews before or after it. The interviewer introduces the inter-
viewee to the topic with a short and general description and then allows the
interviewee to answer how ever he or she pleases. Unstructured interviews
are able to provide in-depth information on the topic at hand. However, un-
structured interviews are limited to the interviewee’s ability to communicate.
An interviewee who is not fond of talking may not reveal as much informa-
tion as expected. Furthermore, it can be difficult for the researcher to find
patterns or common themes amongst participants, since each interview may
vary substantially from the others.
Semi-structured interviews comprise structured and unstructured elements,
shifting between a more structured approach at times, but allowing for suffi-
cient depth as well. Researchers influence the direction of the interview with
leading questions, derived from past research and literature, and follow up
on points of interest when applicable. This allows the researcher to learn
previously unknown information or to place more emphasis on topics that
were previously less important. Struwig and Stead (2001) suggest following
a more unstructured approach with half the interviewees, and progressively
becoming more structured in later interviews. This is a good way to in-
corporate and to maintain a balance between structured and unstructured
elements of the interview process. This approach also allows the researcher to
incorporate and delve deeper into new information revealed by interviewees.
A semi-structured approach was used to interview the federation partic-
ipants. Literature and input from the stakeholders were used to define five
topic areas. Interviewees are asked questions related to each topic area. Ad-
ditional points of interest mentioned by interviewees were followed with the
relevant questions.
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The following section will introduce the first topic area, Initial Adoption.
There after, the remaining four topic areas, Complexity and Understanding,
Incidents, Topology and Success and Failure are introduced and discussed.
5.2 Initial Adoption
Despite initially predicting the rapid adoption of Federated Identity Man-
agement, literature has shown concern for the low rate of Federated Identity
Management adoption in industry. Jensen and Jaatun (2013) state that,
based on the added value of Federated Identity Management, one would
think that industry would be rushing to adopt it. However, this has not
been the case and the adoption of Federated Identity Management has been
lower than expected throughout industry.
Some implementations of Federated Identity Management have experi-
enced modest success in a few specific parts of industry. Shibboleth has
become the dominant means of implementing Federated Identity Manage-
ment within the research and education sector (Landau & Moore, 2012).
The reason for the wide spread usage of Shibboleth and the relative success
of Federated Identity Management within the research and education sector
has been attributed to the more trusted environment of higher education
(Smith, 2008). Chapter 4 discusses the reasons for the success of Shibboleth
in more detail.
Besides this, literature does not discuss other factors that have con-
tributed to the success of Federated Identity Management in this sector on a
global scale. Furthermore, the unique challenges affecting the adoption and
implementation of Federated Identity Management within the research and
education sector have not been identified or discussed within literature.
The first topic area addressed in the interviews was initial adoption and
barriers to the adoption of Federated Identity Management within the re-
search and education sector.
Interviewees are asked about the initial adoption of their federations and
if it was lower than expected. Additionally, what solutions had been imple-
mented to combat this and to encourage adoption.
The output of this topic area will aid future federations in this sector to
avoid the challenge of low initial adoption and thus enable them to join the
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global network of federations with less delay.
5.3 Complexity and Understanding
Smith (2008) states that Federated Identity Management is not rocket sci-
ence, but that there is confusion with regard to the complexities involved.
Rogers (1995) defines complexity as the degree to which an innovation is
perceived as difficult to understand. It is clear from both statements that
the perceived complexity of Federated Identity Management is related to in-
dustry’s understanding of the risks associated with Federated Identity Man-
agement and the value it provides.
Chapter 3 discusses a number of complexities in the implementation of
Federated Identity Management, such as liability, the establishment of trust
and new security risks. A lack of general awareness amongst institutions and
their users, is also discussed in Chapter 3 and contributes to the perceived
complexity of Federated Identity Management.
While literature has attributed the general success of Federated Identity
Management within the research and education sector to high levels of trust,
literature has not discussed the impact of this trust, on the perceived com-
plexity of Federated Identity Management within this sector. The purpose
of this second topic area is to gain an understanding of how perceived com-
plexity has affected Federated Identity Management within the research and
education sector.
Interviewees are asked to gauge the level of complexity that is involved in
Federated Identity Management in this sector and the impact it has on local
potential adopters. Furthermore, interviewees are asked how they addressed
members’ understanding, perceived complexity and, by extension, perceived
risk of Federated Identity Management.
The output of this topic area will assist future federations in simplifying
and reducing the perceived risk of Federated Identity Management, tailoring
it to their unique local environments.
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5.4 Incidents
The previous section has addressed the impact that perceived complexity and
understanding has on the adoption of Federated Identity Management. Re-
lated to this is the occurrence and handling of incidents. Federated Identity
Management literature contains many discussions proposing solutions to var-
ious security and privacy breaches. Landau and Moore (2012) state that the
assignment of liability in the case of information security or privacy breaches
is a major stumbling block in many federations. Landau et al. (2009) give
the example of identity providers who typically bear liability for the identity
assertions they make and that service providers prefer to lower their own risk
by relying on these assertions.
Within the research and education sector, implementations of Federated
Identity Management such as Shibboleth have gone far in assigning liability
to the appropriate parties. However, it is unrealistic to assume that security
breaches will never happen within Federated Identity Management. Acci-
dental breaches of information security and privacy are far more likely in a
federated environment where external institutions all have a role to play in
the protection of shared information. None the less, the effect of incidents
occurring by accident can have the same negative impact as incidents caused
by malicious parties. The purpose of this third topic area, is to learn how
the research and education sector has addressed the challenges of resolving
incidents.
Interviewees are asked about the relationship between members of the
federation and how incidents are addressed and solved.
The output of this topic area will help new federations to adopt a real-
istic approach to managing the occurrence of incidents and the relationship
between members of the federation successfully.
5.5 Topology
Federated Identity Management literature discusses centralized and distributed
models of identity management in detail. However, the identity management
model should not be confused with the underlying topology of the federation
network. During meetings with the stakeholders, the choice of which topology
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to implement was a topic of great importance. Both, identity management
models and topologies, are discussed in Chapter 3.
There is a gap in Federated Identity Management literature with regard
to the various topology options the differences between the topology op-
tions, and the decision making process one must consider when choosing a
topology. Both the Full-Mesh and the Hub-and-Spoke topology are used
throughout the research and education sector. Each of the topologies pro-
vides unique benefits and has certain shortfalls. The success of Federated
Identity Management may be greatly affected depending on which topology
is implemented. The purpose of this topic area is to discuss the importance
and the nature of the underlying network topologies within the research and
education sector.
Interviewees are asked to define and discuss the network topology they
have implemented within their federation and the reasons that they preferred
it over other topologies. Furthermore, interviewees are asked to discuss the
impact that network topology has on a particular environment and on the
institutions within.
The output of this topic area will assist future federations in making the
decision of which network topology to implement and how it will effect their
unique environment.
5.6 Success and Failure
Horbe and Hotzendorfer (2015) state that data minimization and releasing
only the attributes needed to authenticate a user is well established within
the research and education sector and can be considered as state of the
art. Literature has also made special mention of the research and education
sector with regard to the successful implementations of Federated Identity
Management. This research aims to identify, discuss and compile the unique
factors that have made Federated Identity Management work in this sector
of industry.
However, using Federated Identity Management literature as the main
source of information when creating the previous topic areas, is a potential
shortfall of this research. The purpose of the final topic area is to identify
additional practices unique to the research and education sector that have
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aided in the relative success of Federated Identity Management in this sector
of industry.
Interviewees are asked to identify and discuss addition practices that have
brought success to their federation as well as practices that have not gone
as expected. Interviewees are then asked to conclude with with any extra
information they wish to provide.
The output of this topic area will reveal additional factors or points of
interest that will aid future federations, including, how to make full use of the
unique environment of the research and education sector and how to avoid
potential challenges of this environment, not discussed in literature.
5.7 Conclusion
Semi-structured interviews were used to collect the experiences of seven
selected federations from the research and education sector. The semi-
structured approach allowed the interviewer to control the direction of the
interviews through five topic areas derived from literature and stakeholder
input. Interviewees were encouraged to elaborate on the topic areas as they
pleased, enabling the extraction of information not found in literature.
All seven interviews were recorded, with the consent of the interviewees to
allow the later transcription of the interviews in detail. The transcripts will
be coded and organized into meaningful families to enable in-depth analysis.
The following chapter, Analysis, will analyse and extract all relevant data
from the interviews. Chapter 7, Lessons, will present the final lessons learnt
from implementing Federated Identity Management within the research and
education sector.
Chapter 6
Analysis
The previous chapter, Interviews, describes the five topic areas upon which
the interviews were based. All seven interviews were transcribed and coded
as described in Chapter 2, Research Methodology.
The purpose of this chapter is to organize the bites of coded information
from the interviews and to structure it in a concise and meaningful way
together with literature. Each topic area is analyzed separately, to maintain
the original semi-structured nature of the interviews. The chapter concludes
by summarizing the main findings in list form.
6.1 Transcription and Coding
All interviewees gave consent to be recorded. The recordings were then used
to transcribe each interview using ATLAS.ti 7.
An interview transcript is an academic record of an interview used as part
of the analysis process. Transcripts contain a high level of detail in a writ-
ten form. The benefits of transcribing the recorded interviews are twofold.
Transcripts are used for presentation purposes and allow a deep interaction
with the text, which is not achieved by listening to voice recordings (Ravitch
& Carl, 2015).
ATLAS.ti was further used to code the interview data into groups. Coding
comprised two levels: initial codes and family codes. Initial codes are used
in conjunction with the transcribed interviews, for categorizing and grouping
the replies of interviewees. Family codes are high-level codes that sort the
initial, low-level codes into more meaningful groups.
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6.2 Topic Area 1 - Initial Adoption
At the beginning of the 21st century, literature was optimistic about Fed-
erated Identity Management and predicted wide spread adoption. Industry
took a conservative approach to Federated Identity Management and there-
fore, the adoption of Federated Identity Management did not meet the ex-
pectations of literature. A number of factors have been attributed to the
low adoption of Federated Identity Management within industry. In their
paper: “Federated Identity Management - We Built It; Why Won’t They
Come?” Jensen and Jaatun (2013) discuss the benefits of Federated Iden-
tity Management that have been offset by challenges. The theory of Rogers
(1995) regarding the diffusion of innovation has been used by researchers
such as Jensen (2014) and Hu¨hnlein et al. (2010) to explain a low initial rate
of adoption in different sectors of industry.
6.2.1 The Adoption Barrier
The research and education sector has been relatively more successful in
implementing Federated Identity Management and has seen a higher rate of
adoption compared to other parts of industry. Smith (2008) and Landau and
Moore (2012) have attributed this to the trusted environment of the research
and education sector. EduGAIN is proof of the success of Federated Identity
Management amongst institutions of research and education. Since 2017,
EduGAIN interconnects over 40 federations globally, as shown in Chapter 4,
FIM in Research and Education.
However, the adoption of Federated Identity Management within the re-
search and education sector was not simple. Rather, it has been a continuous
effort spanning well over a decade.
“So it was a lot of work involved. It wasn’t just, it’s there now
people will come.” (Interviewee 1)
Interviewees have confirmed that there is a barrier to the adoption of
Federated Identity Management within the research and education sector,
despite its apparent success.
“I would say our rate of adoption was also relatively slow.” (In-
terviewee 2)
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The purpose of interviewing federations within the research and education
sector is to learn how this sector has capitalized on its unique strengths and
has mitigated challenges to become one of the most successful implementers
of Federated Identity Management.
Although collaboration between institutions within the research and ed-
ucation sector is common, and therefore well suited for Federated Identity
Management, many institutions have shown resistance to and little interest
in joining a federation.
Eduroam, a global service allowing students and researchers to access the
internet at other participating educational institutions, using the credentials
of their home institution, experienced similar challenges during its adoption
phase.
“The roll out of Eduroam [..] took many years and in part was
very slow in a large part because the people that were rolling it
out weren’t the people visiting other campuses” (Interviewee 7)
Despite the fact that Federated Identity Management has been used
within the research and education sector at large for well over a decade,
the awareness amongst the users of Federated Identity Management, as op-
posed to the customers of Federated Identity Management, is low. While
users such as students and researchers benefit from the value of Federated
Identity Management, the customers, such as the IT department, only see
the added work, challenges and risks involved.
“In some of the more research-intensive universities, the researchers
carry a lot of weight. So, I think the problem is now that they’re
just not aware that this is something they should be asking for,
that this is a benefit, and their IT departments in some cases are
not telling them.” (Interviewee 7)
From what the interviewees have said, it is clear that a significant barrier
exists to the adoption of Federated Identity Management within the research
and education sector. This mirrors the adoption barrier found in the rest
of industry. However, to overcome these barriers may require a unique ap-
proach. The next section describes how the research and education sector
has overcome the adoption barrier.
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6.2.2 Overcoming the Adoption Barrier
The previous section makes it clear that there is still a barrier to the adoption
of Federated Identity Management within the research and education sector.
The success of a federation is dependent on how it overcomes this barrier.
Federations within the research and education sector have used different ap-
proaches to address this challenge.
It is the nature of the research and education sector to be at the forefront
of many ideas and technologies. Early adopters seeking to be at the forefront
of new developments should be welcomed as partners and examples to other
potential adopters.
“So I would say part of this is identifying those individuals at
those campuses that get it and really reaching out to them and
engaging them in terms of case studies.” (Interviewee 2)
When the federation operator identifies potential adopters and invests
resources into their smooth integration into the federation, the rest of the
community has an example to follow. Additionally, a number of interviewees
mentioned the integration of popular services, as a means to attracting insti-
tutions. Establishing partnerships with service providers and making their
service available through the federation, adds immediate value for users.
“there was a singular service that everyone wanted and we made
the wise decision to build the federation around this service, mean-
ing you can only get this service if you join the federation. Since
this service was so popular that’s what brought us strong federa-
tion membership early on.”
“So, there was awareness in parts of our community that this
is the right thing to do, but you still need the carrot that makes
people jump through the hoops.”(Interviewee 6)
Exclusive partnerships with service providers such as this, is a clear real
world manifestation of the value of Federated Identity Management.
Approaching the correct audience is essential to creating a demand for
Federated Identity Management within institutions. Often the customers
are not the users of the service. This is also true within the research and
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education sector. An IT department may have different motives and goals
to those of the research department.
While it is important to market Federated Identity Management to the
appropriate customers, it is just as important to introduce and market Fed-
erated Identity Management to the users. Communicating with the library
department is a good way to reach users and to create a demand for Federated
Identity Management from the inside. Once there is a demand for Federated
Identity Management amongst the users, pressure will be placed on the IT
department (customer) to implement Federated Identity Management.
“So, for me an interesting problem is how to get into those de-
partments without talking to the IT departments without treading
on too many toes, given the fact the IT departments are in fact
my customer. So, I’m going to the library conference later this
year for this very reason, to talk to librarians, not to talk to IT
people. I need to talk to research staff for the same reason, we
need to get the other parts aware.” (Interviewee 7)
Making an example out of established federation partners, creating a need
by adding services of high demands to the federation and communicating
the value of Federated Identity Management to the appropriate audience
are some of the ways the research and education sector is overcoming the
adoption barrier.
6.3 Topic Area 2 - Complexity and Under-
standing
Rogers (1995)’s Theory of Diffusion of Innovation presents five attributes of
innovations that potential adopters perceive. Two of these attributes are rel-
evant to this section. Firstly, complexity and secondly, observability. Smith
(2008) describes the situation as follows, “While identity federation is not
rocket science, there is confusion about what it delivers and the complexity
involved.”
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Complexity
Rogers (1995) defines complexity as the degree to which an innovation is
perceived as difficult to understand and use. At an institutional level, com-
plexity is often linked with risk. As complexity increases, so does the risk
increase.
“I think identity management in general is difficult to understand,
and uh, federated identity management uhm, is even more difficult
in some ways because people jump right to the risks.” (Interviewee
2)
A more accurate description would be that the risks have changed, not
necessarily increased. Interviewee 2 and interviewee 4 describe why insti-
tutions may perceive an increase of risk, but also that Federated Identity
Management reduces current risks, especially with collaboration at a global
scale.
“so Id say the risk for IT for scaling all of these services and
access to them is a significant, it’s significant without federated
access.” (Interviewee 2)
“So the risk might be kind of higher, but there’s no economically
viable alternative to doing that, because everyone’s accessing so
many systems today. So it would be impossible for a user to main-
tain a lot of accounts of different systems without the federated
identity” (Interviewee 4)
Observability
Rogers (1995) defines observability as the degree to which the results of an
innovation are visible to others. Together with a lack of awareness in general,
many institutions do not understand how Federated Identity Management
works and how it provides value.
“They’re massively over reacting to a perceived threat that isn’t
real, because they don’t understand the technology.” (Interviewee
7)
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The level of understanding amongst institutions is partly dependent on
their motivation or attitude towards Federated Identity Management. As
stated in Topic Area 1, there is a lack of motivation to research and adopt
Federated Identity Management amongst institutions. This has an effect on
their understanding of Federated Identity Management. Steps must be taken
to educate institutions on how Federated Identity Management works, what
it requires from each player, and the value of being part of a federation.
Extending an invitation to institutions to participate in the development
of the Federated Identity Management system, allows them to contribute in
various stages of the development cycle, to voice concerns and to adapt them-
selves. Even if only a handful of institutions participate in the development
of the federation, those early adopters act as an example to demonstrate the
value of Federated Identity Management to the institutions who have not yet
joined.
“Uhm everybody was asked to be involved [..] Especially in the
early stages where the rules were still flexible.” (Interviewee 1)
“People don’t really understand how it can be used, what the value
is until they see it in place. So you have to get a few really key
visionaries demonstrating the value of it and then just communi-
cate the uhm, in a very consistent and repeatable way those case
studies to others and they will get it.” (Interviewee 2)
Interviewees 1 and 2 emphasize the importance of involving institutions
who are willing to accept initial risk for the sake of innovation. When the
federation is operational, the success of the early adopters can be used to
convince cautious institutions of the benefit and value of Federated Identity
Management by providing them with a real world example.
6.4 Topic Area 3 - Incidents
General security and privacy and the risk of breaches is an acknowledged
concern in Federated Identity Management literature. Chapter 3 discusses
the issue of liability and how it can lead to the failure of a federation. As far as
liability is concerned, SAML 2.0 and Shibboleth have delegated responsibility
and liability to the various players of the federation.
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Once it is known who is responsible and liable for each step in the Fed-
erated Identity Management process, the task of addressing incidents is less
complex. However, incidents, no matter how small, have to be managed
and handled in an appropriate way that will ease the concerns of federation
members and potential adopters.
A number of the interviewees mentioned issues that arose from small
misconfigurations and from the release of attributes. However, what is the
role of the federation operator with regard to solving incidents for which it
is not responsible?
“what does the federation handle and what does it not? Do we
handle just general security problems between two federation par-
ticipants, is that our role? Or is our role to really kind of, and I
think we kind of collectively tryna figure this out. Or is our role
to really help broker?” (Interviewee 2)
In cases where there is a problem with the infrastructure in a Hub-and-
Spoke federation or errors in meta-data issued by a Full-Mesh federation, the
federation operator is liable and responsible, and so their role in resolving
the incident is clear. However, in many of the examples provided by the
interviewees, the federation operator’s role was not clear.
The interviewees mentioned how they intervened to help resolve many
of these issues even if they were not at fault, or if it was not necessarily
their responsibility. Most of the issues mentioned were easily solved through
communication between the affected parties. The federation operator acted
as the intermediary or broker of the conversation.
“Or is our role to really help broker? Getting the various parties
in a slack channel and talking with them about how do we address
this.” (Interviewee 2)
“It’s just a matter of us joining the dots between the service
provider and the identity provider, understanding what the issue
was and getting it resolved.” (Interviewee 1)
From a description of the incidents, it is clear that the members of the
federation see the federation operator as a central and authoritative entity.
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Encouraging and facilitating friendly cooperation when solving incidents will
assist with easing the concerns of member institutions.
“So we’ve been trying to foster a sort of friendly community, not
a, they’re doing the wrong thing let’s go and attack them sort of
thing.” (Interviewee 1)
Supplementing this approach with personnel that have established good
relationships with the institutions will aid in the smooth and speedy termi-
nation of incidents.
“And we have tried to get longevity of those kind of front line
staff. I mean I’ve been here 5 years. One of my colleagues have
been here 10 years or something like that. So these are the people
who are doing the support that have now gotten a good repo [rep-
utation]. I mean weve got a decent repo with both the SP [Service
Provider] and the IdP [Identity Provider] operators. So if there
are issues that arise, we’ve hopefully kind of built that trust up,
and uhm, providing, you know decent quality advice there can
generally solve those kinds of issues.” (Interviewee 3)
The federation operators have found that they play an important role in
the mitigation and closure of incidents throughout the federation and between
member institutions. The federation operator is able to act as a third trusted
party facilitating the closure of incidents. By establishing and maintaining
good relationships with federation members, incidents are able to be resolved
quickly and before they can develop into more persistent problems.
6.5 Topic Area 4 - Topology
The relative success of Federated Identity Management within the research
and education sector has been noted in literature. However, literature does
not discuss why this is so. One aspect of Federated Identity Management
that literature has not addressed is the range of and differences between the
physical implementation and topology of Federated Identity Management.
The interviewees, on the other hand, were very outspoken with regard
to making the decision between Hub-and-Spoke and Full-Mesh topologies.
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An introduction to the Hub-and-Spoke and Full-Mesh topologies from the
perspective of the stakeholders of this research can be found in Chapter 3.
6.5.1 Hub-and-Spoke
Although the Hub-and-Spoke topology has a central component, it should not
be confused with the centralized model of identity management mentioned in
Chapter 3. The Hub-and-Spoke topology discussed here is a fully distributed
model of Federated Identity Management. Each institution can act as an
identity provider and as a service provider and users are authenticated by
their home institution.
The Hub-and-Spoke topology centralizes a large portion of the technol-
ogy needed to implement Federated Identity Management. This reduces the
technical requirements on the part of the participating institutions and thus
lowers the barrier to entry.
“So, the big advantage is that it lowers the barrier to entry. It
takes a lot of the technology away from the institutions and cen-
tralizes it. Which means we can help the institutions that arent
mature enough join a federation before they would be ready to do
so in a Full-Mesh world.” (Interviewee 7)
“an ease of integration which helps really early on I would say. In
getting the service providers and the identity providers together.”
(Interviewee 2)
Smaller institutions with a limited IT department that is not capable of
establishing and maintaining links with all the members of the federation, will
benefit from the simplified single link to the central hub in a Hub-and-Spoke
topology.
By reducing the technical requirements of the institutions, the technical
requirements on the part of the federation operator are increased. The feder-
ation operator must be able to establish and maintain the central hub. This
requires adequate manpower and capital, which can be difficult to come by
in the first few years of the federation’s establishment.
“Do they have the manpower to support Hub-and-Spoke? It’s ob-
viously much more manpower intensive because you need the fed-
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eration operator to broker the relationship between services and
end points.” (Interviewee 5)
The federation operator accepts the bulk of the responsibility and there-
fore liability, in the event of an incident. Part of this responsibility and need
for capital is to build for redundancy. The central nature of the Hub-and-
Spoke introduces a single point of failure and so steps need to be taken to
ensure the smooth and speedy transition to a back-up in the event of a loss
in availability.
“because you can’t have a single point of failure for the whole
country right, so you need to build in redundancy and clustering.”
(Interviewee 6)
All of these factors make the Hub-and-Spoke topology an expensive and
complex option. The environment in which the federation exists must have
a need for the specific benefits that a Hub-and-Spoke topology provides.
“So you have to look very closely at what you think you can only
do in a hub, and then weigh that against the costs it will bring in
operations, in complexity ..” (Interviewee 6)
The benefits of a Hub-and-Spoke topology include a reduced barrier to
entry for institutions as well as a number of centralized services offered by the
federation operators. These benefits come at the expense of the federation
operator who must be able to maintain the central hub both in terms of
manpower and of cost.
6.5.2 Full-Mesh
The Full-Mesh topology is simpler to implement for the federation operator.
Each participating institution assumes the technical responsibility of making
sure they are correctly configured and connected to the federation operator
and federation members. The federation operator provides the meta-data to
all the members. However, since data does not move through a central hub,
the federation operator is not liable for any data breaches.
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“So any SP [Service Provider] and IdP [Identity Provider] can
interoperate without reference to us as the federation operator or
without the federation infrastructure coming into play. We also
don’t have any visibility into the uhm, the individual participants,
uhm configuration [..] We’re very kind of, uhm, we’re very hands
off in that kind of sense with the full mesh.” (Interviewee 3)
Putting more responsibility on the individual members of the federation
can be a significant barrier to entry for many institutions, especially smaller
institutions such an independent research unit, who may not have a large
and capable IT department.
“There’s a lot to be said for full mesh federations, don’t get me
wrong, but I think it relies on a level of maturity and funding.”
(Interviewee 7)
Furthermore, implementing upgrades and updates or effecting change
across the federation is slow and difficult. Owing to the fact that each
federation member is individually connected to every other member, and
is responsible for its own configuration, rolling out change must be done in-
dependently by each federation member. A Hub-and-Spoke, topology for
comparison, implements change onto the central hub.
“But I think the problem that we find is that, it’s quite difficult
to effect change quickly. I think it means that we can’t respond
particularly quickly to uhm, as a federation, to those new develop-
ments. But this is not to say that the individual participants cant
move fast. But it means that the federation as a whole can’t.”
(Interviewee 3)
However, the independent nature of the Full-Mesh topology allows for
much better scaling. It is for this reason that EduGAIN uses a Full-Mesh
topology instead of a Hub-and-Spoke topology.
Interviewee 5 explained how a Full-Mesh topology allows the federation
to exist through different legal environments. Each institution makes a deci-
sion as to whether it is willing to accept additional risk by interaction with
an institution governed by different local or national laws. This approach
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has been used to enable EduGAIN to interconnect institutions from all over
the world. If the federation operator was liable for all transactions, only in-
stitutions able to meet strict requirements would be allowed to participate.
In turn, this would have a negative impact on the adoption of Federated
Identity Management.
“because there are European data protection rules, it was unclear
whether interactions through that hub, we were then responsible
for the final delivery for the information. If that was the case,
we wouldn’t be able to let a South African log into an Australian
service because we could accept the credentials into the hub, but we
couldn’t send it to Australia because Australia doesn’t have data
protection regulations which are compatible with Europe. So at the
moment now South Africa, SAFIRE and the Australian Access
Federation, they can actually broker a deal, a trust agreement
or the institutions can individually select that to be able to send
information to a service.” (Interviewee 5)
A Full-Mesh topology allows institutions to direction communication with
each other without having to go through a central component. This allows
the entire federation to scale well. However, institutions must understand
Federated Identity Management and must be financially able to establish
and maintain connection with the federation. Furthermore, implementing
change on a federation-wide scale is slow as each institution must comply
individually.
6.5.3 Hybrid Topology
Despite the focus on Hub-and-Spoke and Full-Mesh topologies, many of the
interviewees mentioned a middle ground, or a hybrid topology.
“Oh and also it’s a spectrum. It’s not an either-or kind of thing.”
(Interviewee 3)
While each interviewee spoke about which side of the spectrum their
federation began at, either Hub-and-Spoke or Full-Mesh, many interviewees
added that their federation has begun to incorporate aspects of the other.
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“So, the first thing that you need to understand is that every
federation worldwide is becoming a Hybrid federation. All the
Full-Mesh federations are introducing Hub-and-Spoke elements,
and all the Hub-and-Spoke federations are becoming more Full-
Mesh like.” (Interviewee 7)
The decision to start a federation with a Hub-and-Spoke or Full-Mesh
topology is an important one that requires research and understanding of the
local environment. However, as Federated Identity Management progresses
and new breakthroughs are being made, the line between the two topologies
is fading.
A federation is unlikely to remain the topology it originally began as. As
the barrier to entry decreases and the maturity of the federation members
increases, a Hub-and-Spoke federation may incorporate aspects of a Full-
Mesh federation.
Similarly, a Full-Mesh federation may incorporate aspects of a Hub-and-
Spoke topology as the federation matures and becomes more established and
self-sufficient.
“We’ve got a hybrid topology, so we got primarily a mesh sit-
ting in the middle [...] Uhm, we’ve gone beyond that that we’ve
attached a thing called rapid connect which is a bit of a spoke
type thing for Hub-and-Spoke which sort of sits off on one side.”
(Interviewee 1)
“We call that the hybrid so that we, from the outside we look like
a Mesh but on the inside, we’re able to work either as a Mesh or
as a Hub-and-Spoke federation.” (Interviewee 4)
Interviewee 7 summarizes the discussion of topologies as follows:
“So, the obvious way of looking at this is it’s really which side of
the equation you start on. Do you start as a Full-Mesh or do you
start as a Hub-and-Spoke , knowing that ultimately everyone is
becoming a Hybrid?” (Interviewee 7)
As Federated Identity Management evolves and underlying aspects such
as topology improve, the research and education sector is moving towards a
mix of both Hub-and-Spoke and Full-Mesh topologies.
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6.6 Topic Area 5 - Success and Failure
The previous four topic areas find their origins in Federated Identity Man-
agement literature and input from stakeholders. However, as mentioned
throughout earlier parts of this research, literature is incomplete, especially
concerning the research and education sector. To learn additional lessons
from successful or unsuccessful ventures, interviewees were asked to discuss
any additional factors that positively or negatively influenced their federa-
tions at some point.
6.6.1 Maturity and Trust
In Topic Area 3, encouraging an environment of co-operation and mutual
support was shown to be beneficial to the speedy and successful handling of
incidents as they arise. Similarly, an environment that treats each member
institution as separate from the federation can have a negative impact on the
growth of the federation. Encouraging institutions to think at the federation
level will create an environment that promotes mutual growth and increased
trust amongst members of the federation.
“Just recently we’ve started to notice the maturity in the thinking
of the universities in the federation and how they deal with the
federation [...] It’s the observation that they’re starting to think
federation wide as opposed to just thinking enterprise wide when
it comes to these things.” (Interviewee 1)
Smith (2008) states that trust is the backbone of Federated Identity Man-
agement. Even in the research and education sector, continuously developing
trust amongst institutions and the federation will have positive ripple effects.
Interviewee 2 recommended introducing a lightweight set of baseline practices
that increase over time.
This will improve the standardization of processes throughout the feder-
ation and will reduce risk. This leads to a safer and more trusted federation
environment.
“I would have a baseline set of practices that are very very lightweight.
That everybody can adhere to and put a place and an expectation
that those will raise over time.”
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“A lot of them will have a unique identifier, but it’s not persistent
and they reassign it. Make sure they don’t reassign it.” (Intervie-
wee 2)
The interviewee put a clear emphasis on the fact that any baseline stan-
dardized practices should be extremely lightweight, especially in the begin-
ning. Interviewee 5 too, emphasizes this point.
“We can either mandate these rules, which mean every member
in every federation has to participate, and if they don’t that means
we have to cut the whole federation. So our minimum rules have
to be quite low.” (Interviewee 5)
Introducing and enforcing baseline practices with high requirements will
raise the barrier to entry and may exclude smaller institutions that cannot
fulfil them. This may do more harm to the federation than good, by reducing
the overall adoption.
6.6.2 Industry Standards
There are many ways in which Federated Identity Management can be im-
plemented. Over the past decade, a select few have stood out from others.
Shibboleth is an example of an implementation of Federated Identity Man-
agement that has been much more successful than any other implementation
within the research and education sector, as discussed in Chapter 4. Simple-
SAMLphp is an example of an alternative to Shibboleth that has been used
within the research and education sector.
“one thing I guess we’ve made wrong from the start was that
we went with SimpleSAMLphp and it has a lot of non-standard
configuration options. So what we have learnt is, keep, use the
standards of meta-data and everything else actually. And we’ve
been kind of moving in that direction now.” (Interviewee 4)
Thanks to the standardization of many aspects of Federated Identity
Management within the research and education sector, new federations have
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the advantage of being able to adopt the most common standards and meth-
ods of implementations. This reduces the learning curve for federation oper-
ators as well as for federation members and increases the initial trust in the
federation. Cost and risk is also reduced.
“Standing on the shoulders of giants basically is really easy. Now
like you said the land scape has matured and we know what kind of
policies we need and what we need for security and technologies.”
(Interviewee 6)
New and future federations have the advantage of skipping the stage of
trial and error and benefiting from the standards mapped out by the initial
federations within the research and education sector.
“A brand new federation doesn’t have that legacy baggage [...] be-
cause they come to it with fresh eyes.” (Interviewee 5)
Established standards of implementing and maintaining Federated Iden-
tity Management within the research and education sector have the potential
to reduce technical and financial burdens for new federations. Neglecting the
accepted standards is a decision that must be made with caution.
6.7 Concluding Remarks
The previous sections organized and discussed the information provided by
the interviews. This section concludes the main points summarized from
each section.
Initial Adoption
• There is a barrier to the adoption of Federated Identity Management
within the research and education sector
• The customers of Federated Identity Management are often not the
users
• Make users aware of the value of Federated Identity Management
• Early adopters act as an example for other potential adopters
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• Making popular services available exclusively through the federation
attracts potential adopters
Complexity and Understanding
• Institutions within the research and education sector perceive Feder-
ated Identity Management as complex
• The lack of understanding of Federated Identity Management con-
tributes to perceived complexity
• There is no viable alternative to Federated Identity Management within
the highly collaborative environment of the research and education sec-
tor
• The participation of potential adopters in the development and im-
provement of the federation has a positive effect on the awareness and
understanding of Federated Identity Management
Incidents
• The federation operator has the ability to act as a trusted third party
in the resolving of incidents
• Creating a friendly environment has a positive effect on the turnaround
time of incidents
• Establishing and maintaining good relationships with federation mem-
bers aids in resolving incidents quickly
Topology
• A Hub-and-Spoke topology lowers the barrier of entry for federation
members
• A Hub-and-Spoke topology places more responsibility on the federation
operator
• The technical responsibility of a Full-Mesh topology is spread more
evenly throughout the federation
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• The underlying federation topology is a spectrum between Hub-and-
Spoke and Full-Mesh
• A federation’s local environment plays a primary role in which topology
best suits it
Success and Failure
• Encouraging unity amongst federation members aids in the maturity
of the federation
• Baseline practices assist in developing trust within the federation
This chapter organized and discussed the practices of federations that are
responsible for the relative success of Federated Identity Management within
the research and education sector. Chapter 7, Lessons, compiles and discusses
the final lessons learnt from implementing Federated Identity Management
within the research and education sector.
Chapter 7
Lessons
The position of Federated Identity Management literature has changed from
one of optimism at the adoption of Federated Identity Management to a
state of concern, when it became clear that industry did not share litera-
ture’s enthusiasm for Federated Identity Management. Industry has taken
a conservative approach to the adoption of Federated Identity Management.
As a result, literature has identified a number of factors that hinder the
adoption of Federated Identity Management.
Chapter 5 describes the process of interviews that took place with estab-
lished federations around the globe within the research and education sector.
The aim of the interviews was to learn how similar or different the imple-
mentation of Federated Identity Management has been within this sector of
industry. Chapter 6 displays an analysis of the data collected from the inter-
views. Together with previous literature from Chapter 3 and 4, a number of
practices used within the research and education sector have been extracted.
This chapter, Lessons, contains the final version of the lessons learnt from
implementing Federated Identity Management within the research and edu-
cation sector.
7.1 Lesson 1: Cooperation with Early Adopters
Literature has identified a barrier to the adoption of Federated Identity Man-
agement that exists throughout industry. Chapter 3 discusses a number of
factors and challenges that are responsible for this barrier, such as low aware-
ness aw well as a general lack of understanding.
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This barrier to the adoption of Federated Identity Management is also
present within the research and education sector.
“I would say our rate of adoption was also relatively slow.” (In-
terviewee 2)
Despite this, Federated Identity Management has been relatively success-
ful within the research and education sector (Landau & Moore, 2012; Smith,
2008). Literature does not explain, however, how this sector has addressed
the adoption barrier. Interviewee 1 made mention of the effort involved in
addressing the barrier.
“So it was a lot of work involved. It wasn’t just, it’s there now
people will come.” (Interviewee 1)
Interviewee 2 described their approach to increasing the awareness and
general understanding of their federation.
“So I would say part of this is identifying those individuals at
those campuses that get it and really reaching out to them and
engaging them in terms of case studies.” (Interviewee 2)
Therefore, the purpose of the first lesson is to overcome the initial adop-
tion barrier by using the example of early adopters.
Lesson 1: Use the successful integration of early adopters
as an example for other potential members of the fed-
eration.
Assigning more resources to early members ensures a smooth and success-
ful integration into the federation. Weary and more conservative potential
members will look to the example of early adopters to gauge the reliability of
the federation. Providing a good example for the other potential members of
the federation will have a positive effect on the widespread adoption of the
federation.
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7.2 Lesson 2: Customers and Users
Interviewee 7 pointed out that there is a difference between customers and
users of Federated Identity Management. Users of Federated Identity Man-
agement include students, researchers and library departments, etc. The IT
department is often the customer on behalf of any particular institution and
is responsible for implementation and maintenance.
“So, for me an interesting problem is how to get into those de-
partments without talking to the IT departments.” (Interviewee
7)
Neglecting to address the users about the value of Federated Identity
Management effectively invalidates half of its value. The definition of value,
according to ITIL is: Value = Utility + Warranty (Rudd, Lloyd, & Hun-
neback, 2011). Utility is the desirability of Federated Identity Management
for the user (Fewer passwords, access to more services) and warranty de-
scribes the benefit of Federated Identity Management for the customer (In-
creased security and privacy protection). This definition makes it clear that,
in order for a potential adopter to see the value of Federated Identity Man-
agement, both customer and user must be made aware.
“.. So, I’m going to the library conference later this year for
this very reason, to talk to librarians, not to talk to IT people.”
(Interviewee 7)
Therefore the purpose of this lesson is to raise awareness amongst all the
beneficiaries of Federated Identity Management.
Lesson 2: Propagate the value of Federated Identity
Management both to potential users and to potential
customers.
Successfully demonstrating the value of Federated Identity Management
to users will, in turn, place pressure on the customer to consider the adoption
of Federated Identity Management seriously.
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7.3 Lesson 3: User Demand
Chapter 3 discusses new security and privacy risks associated with Feder-
ated Identity Management, together with initial investment costs. Owing
to perceptions of high complexity and low understanding of Federated Iden-
tity Management, some institutions may place a low priority on joining a
federation.
Interviewee 6 experienced a similar barrier to adoption. Despite the rec-
ognized value of Federated Identity Management, many potential members
placed a low priority on the adoption of Federated Identity Management.
“So, there was awareness in parts of our community that this
is the right thing to do, but you still need the carrot that makes
people jump through the hoops.”(Interviewee 6)
In an attempt to increase the immediate value of Federated Identity Man-
agement, a number of federations within the research and education sector
have made exclusive partnerships with service providers, to offer services of
high demand through the federation.
So we tried a number of uhm, bringing in compute and storage to
researches [...], and to use those services, universities had to be
part of the federation, so that also helped. So that was our sort
of character if you like. Interviewee 1
Therefore, the purpose of this lesson is to reduce further the barrier to
the adoption of Federated Identity Management by creating an immediate
desire to join a federation through the demand for popular services.
Lesson 3: Make popular services available through the
federation by means of partnerships with service providers.
This approach adds a more simplistic argument for the adoption of Fed-
erated Identity Management, one that benefits the customer and users.
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7.4 Lesson 4: Community Participation
Literature has identified complexity as a barrier to the adoption of Federated
Identity Management. Smith (2008) aptly states that Federated Identity
Management is not rocket science, but that there is confusion about what it
delivers and the complexity involved. Interviews revealed a similar challenge
within the research and education sector. Interviewee 2 agrees that potential
adopters may perceive Federated Identity Management as complex.
“I think identity management in general is difficult to understand,
and uh, federated identity management uhm, is even more difficult
in some ways because people jump right to the risks.” (Interviewee
2)
Perceived complexity and a lack of awareness results in a high level of
perceived risk. Both literature and the interviews revealed complexity as a
challenge to the adoption of Federated Identity Management, making it an
important concern for new federations.
However, Federated Identity Management was created as a solution to
an ever growing problem within highly collaborative environments such as
the research and education sector, namely the secure management and cost
of identity management. Interviewee 4 and others point out that within the
research and education sector, there is no alternative to Federated Identity
Management.
“So the risk might be kind of higher but there’s no economically
viable alternative to doing that, because everyone’s accessing so
many systems today. So it would be impossible for a user to main-
tain a lot of accounts of different systems without the federated
identity” (Interviewee 4)
Therefore, the purpose of this lesson is to reduce the perceived risk and
complexity of Federated Identity Management.
Lesson 4: Involve potential adopters in the development
and improvement of the federation.
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By including potential adopters in the development of the federation, in-
stitutions become a part of the development process and have the opportunity
to influence the federation. This involvement reduces perceived complexity
as well as increasing awareness of the federation.
7.5 Lesson 5: Problem Solving
Liability is the state of being legally obliged or responsible (Jensen, 2012).
Landau and Moore (2012) list liability as a major point of contention between
members of a federation. A number of interviewees addressed the topic of
resolving incidents between identity providers and service providers.
The research and education sector has opted for a peaceful approach to
resolving incidents.
“It’s just a matter of us joining the dots between the service
provider and the identity provider, understanding what the issue
was and getting it resolved.” (Interviewee 1)
By intervening as a third party and facilitating co-operative discussions
and resolutions to incidents, a number of the interviewees have mentioned
how they managed to solve problems simply and quickly. Interviewee 5 sug-
gests maintaining longevity of the front-line help desk staff, in an attempt to
create a friendly relationship between the help desk and federation members.
Therefore, the purpose of this lesson to is reduce the impact of incidents
on the relationship between the federation and its members.
Lesson 5: Facilitate and broker a co-operative and prob-
lem solving environment
The correct environment will give members the peace of mind and confi-
dence to approach the federation operator to help resolve incidents as they
occur.
7.6 Lesson 6: Federation Topology
There is a gap within literature with regard to the underlying topology of
a federation, especially within the research and education sector. However,
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talks with stakeholders have revealed the importance and potential impact
that the network topology has on the federation and its local environment.
The two most common federation topologies used within the research and
education sector are Hub-and-Spoke and Full-Mesh. However, interviewees
have described it in reality, as existing on a spectrum.
“Oh and also it’s a spectrum. It’s not an either-or kind of thing.”
(Interviewee 3)
The benefits of each side of the spectrum are discussed in Chapter 6.
From the discussion, it is clear that the benefits of each topology, favour
particular environments over others. The Hub-and-Spoke topology lowers
the technical and monitory barrier to entry for federation members while the
Full-Mesh federation simplifies the initial set up of the federation and places
more responsibility on the federation members.
Therefore, the purpose of this lesson is to emphasise the potential impact
the underlying network topology can have on the adoption and success of a
federation, depending on its unique local environment.
Lesson 6: When making topology decisions, the state
of the local environment and community must be a pri-
mary consideration.
Interviews have also revealed that the future of federation topologies is a
hybrid between Full-Mesh and Hub-and-Spoke.
“So, the obvious way of looking at this is it’s really which side of
the equation you start on [...] knowing that ultimately everyone
is becoming a Hybrid?” (Interviewee 7)
Although the underlying topologies of Federated Identity Management
are moving to a common hybrid, the decision of which side of the spectrum
to start at is still a primary consideration to insuring the successful adoption
of a federation.
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7.7 Lesson 7: Baseline Practices
Interviewee 1 spoke of the benefits of a federation community that has ma-
tured and incorporates a collective view rather than a isolated, self-serving
one.
Just recently we’ve started to notice the maturity in the thinking
of the universities in the federation and how they deal with the
federation [...] It’s the observation that they’re starting to think
federation wide as opposed to just thinking enterprise wide when
it comes to these things. (Interviewee 1)
As a federation matures, initial challenges are solved and new opportuni-
ties arise. Interviewee 1 mentions the collective thinking of the community,
which is only possible if there is a strong underlying fabric of trust. Although
literature praises the research and education sector for its environment of
trust, in order for the federation to mature, so too must the trust between
the federation and federation members increase.
Interviewee 2 has suggested the introduction of lightweight baseline prac-
tises to standardize the collective growth and maturity of all federation mem-
bers, new and old.
“I would have a baseline set of practises, that are very very light
weight. That everybody can adhere to and put a place and an
expectation that those will raise over time.” (Interviewee 2)
Therefore the purpose of this lesson is to standardize the baseline prac-
tises of the federation members with the aim of increasing trust between
institutions and facilitating the progressive maturity of the federation.
Lesson 7: Introduce baseline practises that scale with
the maturity of the federation
As emphasised by interviewee 2, the initial baseline practises must be very
lightweight with the goal of progressively increasing them as the federation
members mature. Interviewee 5 warns that enforcing practises that are too
high will effectively restrict the size of the federation, increase the barrier to
entry and negatively affect the adoption of the federation.
CHAPTER 7. LESSONS 84
7.8 Lesson 8: Industry standards
There are a number of ways to implement Federated Identity Management
throughout industry. Each implementation has unique benefits and chal-
lenges associated with it. Chapter 4 has discussed the state of Federated Iden-
tity Management within the research and education sector, with emphasis on
Shibboleth. As the dominant standard of implementing Federated Identity
Management, Shibboleth is well supported and well understood throughout
this part of industry.
Implementing Federated Identity Management using alternative software
reduces the amount of community support usually available. Interviewee 4
describes the experience their federation has had with alternative methods
of implementing Federated Identity Management.
“one thing I guess we’ve made wrong from the start was that we
went with simple saml php and it has a lot of non-standard con-
figuration options. So what we have learnt is, keep, use the stan-
dards of meta-data and everything else actually.” (Interviewee
4)
Therefore the purpose of this lesson is to encourage the use of indus-
try standards and to avoid potential challenges that accompany alternative
implementations.
Lesson 8: Follow standardized practises of the research
and education sector.
Following the established practises of the research and education sector
increases the understanding of Federated Identity Management by both the
federation operators and federation clients. Similarly, the barrier of adoption
is lower as a result of the familiar technical and non-technical processes that
must take place.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
The previous chapter revealed eight lessons learnt from implementing Feder-
ated Identity Management within the research and education sector. These
lessons are the main contribution of this research study.
This chapter will revisit the objectives and problem statement defined at
the beginning of this study and summarize the progress made throughout
the research process. The contribution of this research study together with
the limitations and recommendations for future studies are also discussed.
The chapter ends off with an epilogue.
8.1 Revisiting the Objectives and Research
Layout
The primary objective of this research was to identity lessons learnt from
implementing Federated Identity Management within the research and edu-
cation sector. To complete this objective, five sub-objectives were fulfilled.
The layout of this study was designed to address and complete these objec-
tives. The layout of the study was discussed in Chapter 2 and is repeated
here for convenience in Figure 8.1.
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Initiation and Planning Phase Knowledge and Data Phase Analysis Phase
Literature 
Review 1
SANReN Visit
Literature 
Review 2
Interviews
Identifying 
Themes
Synthesizing 
Lessons
Phase One Phase Two Phase Three
Figure 8.1: Research Layout
Phase One
Phase one was the initiation and planning phase. This phase and its two
sub components were covered in Chapter 3. This chapter introduced and
discussed Federated Identity Management from the perspective of literature.
The focus was on Federated Identity Management within industry, of which
the research and education sector forms part of. Input from stakeholders
was also included in Chapter 3. The majority of stakeholder input came in
the form of direction, drawing attention to more relevant parts of Federated
Identity Management. Additionally, stakeholders provided input where lit-
erature could not, which can be primarily seen in section 3.2.3, Architecture.
A focus of Chapter 3 was the identification and discussion of the benefits and
challenges of Federated Identity Management throughout industry.
Altogether, phase one fulfilled the following sub-objectives:
• Discuss the state of Federated Identity Management within industry
• Identify and discuss the benefits and challenges of Federated Identity
Management
Phase Two
Phase two of the research was the knowledge and data phase. This phase
has two sub-components, a literature review and interviews.
Chapter 4 contains the extended literature review. This literature review
focused on the research and education sector specifically. It is included in
the knowledge and data phase as it forms part of gathering data about the
research and education sector from literature and stakeholders as well as
setting the scene for the interviews to come.
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Chapter 5 discussed the structure and format of the interviews. The
bulk of the chapter discussed and validated the five topic areas on which all
interviews were based. The purpose of the interviews was to learn from the
real-world experiences of federations within the research and education sector
and to identify factors that influence the adoption and growth of Federated
Identity Management within this sector.
Together, Chapter 4 and 5 fulfilled phase two of this study and the fol-
lowing sub-objectives:
• Determine the current state of Federated Identity Management within
the research and education sector
• Collect the experiences of implementing Federated Identity Manage-
ment throughout the global research and education sector
Together, phase one and phase two fulfil all four of the sub-objectives
defined in Chapter 1, Introduction.
Phase Three
Phase three is the final phase of the research and includes the analysis and
final output of the study. This phase has two sub-components, the identifi-
cation of themes and the synthesis of the final lessons.
Chapter 6 covers the primary analysis of the interviews. Literature and
stakeholder input from previous chapters were used to order and understand
the feedback from the interviewees. The output of the analysis produced
a number of concluding remarks found in section 6.7. These remarks sum-
marize the output of the second phase of the research, knowledge and data
phase.
Chapter 7 synthesized the final output of this study, lessons learnt from
implementing Federated Identity Management within the research and edu-
cation sector. The concluding remarks from Chapter 6 and literature from
Chapter 3 and 4 were used to identify, validate and discuss the final lessons.
Together, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 use the output of the four sub-
objectives with the addition of argumentation to fulfil the primary objective
of the study, to identify lessons learnt from the implementation of Federated
Identity Management within the research and education sector.
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Chapter 7 presents the eight lessons learnt from implementing Federated
Identity Management within the research and education sector.
8.2 Addressing the Problem Statement
Literature has extensively covered various aspects, benefits and challenges
of Federated Identity Management throughout industry. The research and
education sector has been praised for implementing Federated Identity Man-
agement relatively successfully compared to the situation in the majority of
industry. However, Federated Identity Management literature has not cov-
ered the reasons for this relative success. Literature has not examined the
unique challenges of implementing Federated Identity Management within
this sector, nor has literature documented the practises of the research and
education sector in this regard.
There is little insight into the challenges of implement-
ing Federated Identity Management within the research
and education sector. Similarly, there is also little in-
sight into the solutions deployed to overcome the afore-
mentioned challenges.
The research layout shown in the previous section was designed to ad-
dress the primary research objective and hence, this research problem. By
consulting literature and stakeholders together with interviewing federations
within the research and education sector globally, this research produced
eight lessons learnt from implementing Federated Identity Management within
the research and education sector.
These eight lessons provide increased insight into the challenges of imple-
menting Federated Identity Management within the research and education
sector as well as the solutions deployed to overcome those challenges.
8.3 Summary of Contributions
This research study has addressed a problem present in literature and ex-
perienced by stakeholders. The primary contribution of this research study
is eight lessons learnt from implementing Federated Identity Management
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within the research and education sector. These lessons provide increased
visibility into the challenges of implementing Federated Identity Management
within the research and education sector as well as the solutions deployed to
overcome them.
Lesson 1: Cooperation with Early Adopters
Use the successful integration of early adopters as an example
for other potential members of the federation.
The purpose of the first lesson is to overcome the initial adoption barrier
by using the success of early adopters as an example for other potential
adopters.
Lesson 2: Customers and Users
Propagate the value of Federated Identity Management both to
potential users and to potential customers.
The purpose of the second lesson is to increase the awareness of Federated
Identity Management amongst both customers and users, thereby exposing
potential federation members to the full value of Federated Identity Manage-
ment.
Lesson 3: User Demand
Make popular services available through the federation by means
of partnerships with service providers.
The purpose of the third lesson is to reduce further the barriers to the
adoption of Federated Identity Management by creating an immediate desire
to join a federation through the demand for popular services.
Lesson 4: Community Participation
Involve potential adopters in the development and improvement
of the federation.
The purpose of the fourth lesson is to reduce potential adopter’s per-
ceived complexity and risk of joining a federation by integrating them in the
development and improvement of the federation.
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Lesson 5: Problem Solving
Facilitate and broker a co-operative and problem solving environ-
ment
The purpose of the fifth lesson to is reduce the impact that incidents have
on the success of the federation and the relationship between the federation
and its members.
Lesson 6: Federation Topology
When making topology decisions, the state of the local environ-
ment and community must be a primary consideration.
The purpose of the sixth lesson is to emphasise the potential impact
that underlying network topology can have on the adoption and success of a
federation, depending on its unique local environment.
Lesson 7: Baseline Practices
Introduce baseline practises that scale with the maturity of the
federation
The purpose of the seventh lesson is to standardize the baseline prac-
tises of the federation members with the aim of increasing trust between
institutions and facilitating the progressive maturity of the federation.
Lesson 8: Industry standards
Follow standardized practises of the research and education sec-
tor.
The purpose of the eighth lesson is to encourage the use of industry
standards and avoid potential challenges that accompany alternative imple-
mentations.
8.4 Limitations and Future Research
Every notable researcher understands that there are limitations to their re-
search that may have had an effect on the process or outcome of their re-
search. Similarly, one should realize that the word ‘Research’ is also a verb.
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Research is a continuous process that takes into consideration and changes
with new discoveries and progress.
8.4.1 Limitations
Interviews were chosen as the primary method of data collection for this re-
search study. The interviews were based on literature and stakeholder input
as described in Chapter 2 and 5. However, literature and stakeholder input
can only provide a certain level of guidance. To gain additional, detailed
insight into the challenges and accompanying solutions of implementing Fed-
erated Identity Management within the research and education sector, more
data is required at the outset. Preliminary interviews or case studies would
have provided valuable direction for the construction of primary interviews.
Time, resource and limited research experience prevented this course of ac-
tion from being taken.
In total, seven federations were interviewed. However, not all seven in-
terviewees were equally quoted throughout the writing up of this research
study. While all interviewees played a part in the researcher’s interpretation
of the research output, owing to limitations in communication during the in-
terview and transcription processes, some interviewees were referenced more
often than others. Communication issues include language barriers which
had an effect on the understanding and interpretation of interview questions
and replies. Additional limitations in the communication between the in-
terviewer and interviewees arose as a result of spontaneous changes in the
quality of the internet connection, on both ends. Ultimately, this resulted in
minor gaps in the transcription of the interviews. While the impact of this
on the understanding of the researcher was negligible, incomplete sentences
could not be quoted in the writing up of this research.
8.4.2 Future Research
Moving on from this research study, to further increase insight into the chal-
lenges of implementing Federated Identity Management within the research
and education sector as well as the solutions deployed to overcome them,
different research methods can be used.
With a focus on interviews as a qualitative method of research, this re-
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search made use of a semi-structured approach. Chapter 2 describes in-
terviews as existing a spectrum between structured and unstructured ap-
proaches.
Moving on from this research study, future research can gain detailed
insight into how federations within the research and education sector have
implemented or made use of the eight lessons provided, by means of more
structured interviews. Structured interviews allow for the direct comparison
of interviewees and a narrowed focus on specific questions.
On the other side of the spectrum, unstructured interviews provide the
setting to learning and discussing a number of new practises used by feder-
ations throughout the research and education sector. By using this research
together with other research in the field, and with the help of case studies,
well planned and constructed interviews can reveal the practises of this sector
in greater detail.
The federation operators were the subjects of this study. However, as
stated in Chapter 2, federation operators entail only one of four actors in
Federated Identity Management. Users and the federation members (identity
and service providers) have an important role to play in the success of any
federation.
Future research focusing on the perspectives of established federation
members as opposed to new federation members, could reveal the similarities
or differences between reasons for the adoption of and the concerns regarding
the adoption of Federated Identity Management.
Comparing the perspectives of federation members and federation oper-
ators will also reveal points of interest and points of weakness. Identifying
and addressing these points will increase the trust within the federation.
This study has shown that the users of Federated Identity Management
have a role to play in the adoption rate of a federation. Research focusing on
the awareness of Federated Identity Management users and its value together
with the expectations and concerns of users will aid federation members and
operators in the diffusion of Federated Identity Management to users.
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8.5 Epilogue
This research study began with the intention of helping new federations
within the research and education sector to establish themselves by following
the success and learning from the failure of other federations in this sector.
The result is eight lessons learnt from implementing Federated Identity Man-
agement within the research and education sector. Each lesson, derived from
literature, stakeholders and interviews, provide insight into the success and
failure of the research and education sector.
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Appendix A
Transcription and Coding
Transcription and coding is first introduced in Chapter 2, Research Methodology
and then again later in Chapter 5, Interviews. The benefits of transcription is
also presented in earlier chapters and it is clear that to have a deep link with
the interview data, transcribing of the recorded interviews was necessary.
Coding was the next logical step after transcribing the recorded interviews.
Coding of the interview data is the processes of grouping segments of the data
into logical groups. Atlas.ti 7 was used to transcribe and code the recorded
interviews.
The process of transcribing the recorded interviews began as soon as the
first interview was completed, and continued in parallel with the rest of the
interviews. Using Atlas.ti 7, a recording was placed next to a transcription
sheet and transcribed at most, one sentence at a time. In situations where
the interviewee’s speech was not properly audible, I logically filled in the
missing words according to memory and context. However, in situations
where the meaning and context of what was being said was lost, a note was
made in the transcription. Throughout the entire process of transcription,
time stamps were places at regular intervals and after points of interest, for
easy reference.
After the completion of the transcription, the process of coding began.
Instead of using pre-determined codes, I created codes as needed, building
the list of codes seen in Figure A.1 after the final transcript was coded.
Thereafter, I analysed each transcript a second time with the complete list
of codes available. With the transcripts broken up and coded into the initial
groups, the second, more general process of grouping the codes into family
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codes took place. Family codes reduces the number of organizational groups
to be analysed and assist in prioritising more important codes from less
important codes. The list of Family codes produces is shown here again in
Figure A.2 for convenience.
The family codes were then used in conjunction with literature to de-
rive eight lessons learnt from implementing Federated Identity Management
within the research and education sector, contained in Chapter 7.
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Figure A.1: Atlas.ti Codes
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Figure A.2: Atlas.ti Families
